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ATTACK WHEN THE WORLD IS NOT WATCHING? INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AND THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT[†]

Abstract

To minimize political costs, policymakers may strategically time unpopular measures to coincide with other important events that distract the media and the public. We test this hypothesis in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Combining daily data on attacks by both sides with data on the content of news on top U.S. TV networks and on the occurrence of newsworthy events, we show that Israeli attacks are more likely to be carried out one day before U.S. news is expected to be dominated by other important events. Strategic timing of Israeli attacks is driven only by newsworthy events that are predictable and applies only to attacks executed with heavy weapons, due to their higher risk of civilian casualties, and to attacks that are less costly to reschedule, in contrast to targeted killings that are prohibitively costly to delay. Based on comprehensive content analysis of conflict-related news, we document that Israel's strategy is aimed at minimizing news coverage of its attacks on the following day because next-day news is especially charged with negative emotional content. We find no evidence of strategic timing for Palestinian attacks.

JEL Classification: L82 and P16
Keywords: accountability, conflict, mass media and strategic timing

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1. INTRODUCTION

Governments are accountable to the extent that the public is informed about their policies. Mass media ensure accountability by informing citizens about government conduct (e.g., Besley and Prat, 2006; Snyder and Stromberg, 2010). Yet, the extent to which mass media can effectively inform the public depends, among other things, on the presence of other newsworthy events that may crowd out news coverage of governments' actions (Eisensee and Stromberg, 2007). To minimize negative publicity, policymakers may strategically manipulate the timing of their unpopular actions to coincide with other important events that distract the mass media and the public.

On November 19, 1989, the *Jerusalem Post* accused Binyamin Netanyahu, then Israel's deputy foreign minister, of expressing regret, in a speech given at Bar-Ilan University, for the government's failure to exploit the politically favorable situation created by the Tiananmen protests, which captured the world's attention, to carry out large-scale expulsions of Arabs from the Occupied Territories. Mr. Netanyahu denied this, claiming he had only called for the expulsion of nine individuals already designated for deportation.[1] Regardless of how many people Netanyahu intended to deport, he did suggest that the government should use important world events to minimize media scrutiny. Real-world examples of unpopular policies characterized by suspicious timing abound: the launch of Israel's Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, on July 8, 2014, coincided with the FIFA World Cup semifinal match between Brazil and Germany; Russian troops stormed into Georgia on August 8, 2008, the opening day of the Beijing Summer Olympics; Silvio Berlusconi's government passed an emergency decree that freed hundreds of corrupt politicians on July 13, 1994, the

[1] The *Jerusalem Post* opposed Netanyahu's denial, claiming to have a recording of his speech. The following quote is attributed to Netanyahu: *"Israel should have taken advantage of the suppression of the demonstrations in China [Tiananmen Square], when the world's attention was focused on what was happening in that country, to carry out mass expulsions among the Arabs of the Territories. ... However, to my regret, they did not support that policy that I proposed, and which I still propose should be implemented."* It was published on November 28, 1989 in *Hotam* (a supplement to newspaper *Al Hamishmar*) in Hebrew (see Lazar, Y., "Mihad Gisa Vemeidah"/"On the One Hand and On the Other") and reprinted in English by Al-Jazeera in 2009 (*http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/03/200932517163481593 9.html*, accessed on April 15, 2016) and by Corrigan (2016) on p. 234.

day Italy qualified for the FIFA World Cup final.[2]

To investigate whether politicians choose the timing of their unpopular policies strategically to minimize their news coverage, this paper focuses on the timing of military operations during an ongoing conflict that attracts considerable media attention: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israelis and Palestinians care about international public opinion and recognize the importance of media in shaping it. Since the 1970s, the Israeli government has made a considerable effort to project a positive image of Israel and the Israeli army abroad, a policy known as "hasbara," Hebrew for "explanation." This policy encompasses public diplomacy, the Israeli government's work with international journalists in Israel, and the presence of Israeli advocates on social media. Arguably, nothing has a stronger negative impact on international public opinion than civilian victims that result from one's own military actions. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no exception; both sides recognize it, acknowledge the role of the media in shaping perceptions of the conflict abroad, and stress the strategic importance of the media. This attitude is exemplified by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who stated in an interview with CNN on July 20, 2014, while discussing the heart-wrenching images of civilian Palestinian victims in Gaza: *"[Hamas] wants to pile up as many civilian dead as they can... they use telegenically dead Palestinians for their cause."*[3]

News media is important to both sides of the conflict, but could media considerations actually influence the planning of military operations? A statement on June 4, 2002, by Major General Moshe Ya'alon, then the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff designate and currently the defense minister of Israel, strongly suggests this is the case. He said: *"This is first and foremost a war of ideology, and as such the media factor, the psychological impact of our actions, is critical. If we understand that a photograph of a tank speaks against us on CNN, we can take this into account in our decision as to whether or not to send in the tank.*

[2] Online appendix figure A.1 presents examples of front pages of three newspapers on the days following the political events mentioned in these examples. Noticeably, the space allocated to these events was substantially smaller than that devoted to the sports events they coincided with. The practice of releasing potentially harmful information in tandem with other important events is a well-known practice among political spin doctors. This strategy is exemplified by a notorious statement from the former UK Labour Party's spin doctor, Jo Moore, who, in a leaked memo sent to her superiors on the afternoon of 9/11, said that it was "*a very good day to get out anything we want to bury*", [i.e., bad news] (*http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1358985/Sept-11-a-good-day-to-bury-bad-news.html*, accessed on July 7, 2015 and *http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/oct/10/uk.Whitehall*, accessed on July 7, 2015).

[3] http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/20/netanyahu-to-cnns-wolf-blitzer-i-support-taking-whatever-action-is-necessary-to-stop-this-insane-situation/ (accessed on January 19, 2015).

We schedule helicopter operations for after dark so they cannot be photographed easily. ... Such considerations are already second nature to us. Officers ... must understand that there are strategic media considerations. The tension between the need to destroy a particular building or to use a tank or helicopter, and the manner in which the world perceives these actions, can affect the ultimate success or failure of the campaign. Even if we triumph in battle, we can lose in the media and consequently on the ideological plane."[4]

This paper sheds light on how media considerations affect military decisions by testing whether Israeli authorities or Palestinian militants choose the timing of their attacks strategically to coincide with other newsworthy events so as to minimize the negative impact of their actions on U.S. public opinion. Our hypothesis is that Israeli authorities want to avoid U.S. media coverage of their military operations especially when they might lead to civilian casualties. News about civilian casualties resulting from Israeli operations triggers severe criticism from international organizations, U.S. politicians, and human rights activists. It also creates a risk of diminished U.S. support, as it comes under pressure from the U.S. public and members of the UN Security Council.[5] In contrast, the incentives of Palestinian terrorist groups are less clear-cut due to the countervailing effects of publicity on terrorist activity: On the one hand, news coverage of Palestinian terrorist attacks sways U.S. public opinion in favor of Israel, which serves against the Palestinian cause. On the other hand, increased coverage of the attacks against Israel may foster popular support for terrorist organizations across the Middle East and make it easier to attract new recruits and finance from extremists globally. Thus, in the case of the Palestinians, the hypothesis is *a priori* ambiguous. Also, Palestinian terrorist attacks are carried out by a number of independent factions, which creates the possibility of coordination problems between them. Finally, it is also not clear to what extent Palestinians care about public perception of the conflict in the U.S. (as opposed to those in Europe or Arab countries).

[4] The statement was issued in the context of a symposium "The IDF and the Press during Hostilities" held at the Israel Democracy Institute (for the proceedings of the symposium see Nevo and Shur, eds (2003), pp. 84-85). In the online appendix, we provide other selected quotes from the symposium that further corroborate the view that strategic media considerations are an important part of Israel's military doctrine.

[5] For example, as reported by *The Herald* on April 5, 2002: "George W. Bush, the U.S. president, performed a historic U-turn on the Middle East crisis last night by dropping his unqualified support for Israel's military action, declaring: *'The storms of violence cannot go on. Enough is enough...'*" (https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-23504962.html, accessed on March 4, 2016). In the online appendix, we provide a list of links to articles in the international press that cover other examples of the official U.S. reactions to Israeli military actions against Palestinians and how civilian casualties resulted in increased tensions between the U.S. and Israel. These examples illustrate that, despite the overall U.S. support for Israel, U.S. public officials consistently express deep concern with Israeli actions that lead to civilian casualties.

To test the strategic timing hypothesis, we use daily time-series data on the occurrence and severity of both Israeli military operations in the West Bank and Gaza strip and attacks by Palestinian militant groups on the Israeli territory between 2000 and 2011. These data, which were compiled by two independent human rights organizations, include information on the number of attacks (and the resulting number of casualties) carried out by each side on each day. We combine these data with a measure of the presence of other newsworthy events in U.S. media. In particular, we use the direct analogue of the *news pressure* variable first proposed by Eisensee and Stromberg (2007). We compute news pressure as the time devoted to the top three stories, not related to either Israel or Palestine, featured in the evening news in three U.S. TV networks, NBC, ABC, and CBS. News pressure aims at capturing the presence of important news stories that may crowd out the coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on each given day. We also compile a list of important political and sports events with pre-determined timing that dominate U.S. news and are completely unrelated to international affairs. We use the timing of these events both as an instrument for news pressure and as a measure of the *ex ante* expectation for whether U.S. media are likely to cover the important events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

We start by examining whether the timing of Israeli and Palestinian attacks is associated with daily news pressure. We consider two main alternative measures of news pressure: the actual length of the first three stories unrelated to conflict and the length of the first three stories unrelated to conflict adjusted to the total length of non-conflict-related content. The first measure has, by construction, a negative mechanical relationship with the presence of news about the conflict on TV; therefore, it is negatively associated with the conflict events themselves. The second measure does not suffer from such systematic mechanical bias, as documented below. By relating the occurrence and intensity of deadly attacks by each side on a given day to the two measures of news pressure recorded on each day around the attack, we find that the likelihood of deadly military attacks by Israeli forces against Palestinians, as well as the number of casualties they cause, is positively and significantly related to the level of news pressure on the day after the attack is carried out. This is the case for both measures of news pressure, including the unadjusted one, which is mechanically biased against finding a positive relationship between conflict events and news pressure. In contrast, we find no evidence that attacks by Palestinian militant groups are timed to U.S. news pressure. (The difference in the effect of news pressure on attacks by Israelis and Palestinians is

statistically significant.) We examine the robustness of the positive association between the timing of the Israeli attacks and the U.S. news pressure with a battery of robustness checks—including those for model selection, sample, the list of covariates, specific assumptions about the variance-covariance matrix, alternative measures of key variables—and we find that this relationship is very robust. These results suggest that Israeli authorities may chose the timing of their attacks strategically to minimize negative publicity in the United States.

News pressure, however, may be endogenous to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because important domestic U.S. news and Israeli military actions may be jointly determined by unobserved factors, such as important events in the Middle East (e.g., the war in Iraq). Further, many of the news stories on which the news-pressure measure is based refer to unpredictable events to which attacks could not possibly be timed. For both of these reasons, the results based on uninstrumented news pressure could be biased. To address this issue, we compile a list of events from forward-looking U.S. political and sports calendars and create a dummy for predictable events that are unrelated to foreign policy and are significantly related to news pressure. Consistent with the view that Israel times its operations to other newsworthy events, we find that the Israeli attacks are significantly more likely to occur during these events. Similarly, the next-day news pressure, instrumented with these events, has a large and significant positive effect on the timing and severity of Israeli attacks. There is no relationship between these events and the timing of Palestinian attacks. As a placebo exercise, we verify that Israeli attacks are not significantly related to news pressure driven by the unpredictable onset of natural disasters. Again, the differences in these effects are statistically significant.

If the relationship between Israeli attacks and U.S. news pressure is, indeed, driven by strategic timing considerations on the part of Israeli authorities, several additional testable implications arise. First, some military operations are very costly to postpone. For example, special military operations, such as the targeted killings of terrorists who are planning attacks against Israel, are considered of primary importance by the Israel Defense Forces and are conducted whenever a suitable opportunity to hit the target arises. We find no statistically significant relationship between the timing of these urgent, targeted-killing operations and news pressure. Second, one should expect military operations to be timed to news pressure only when they are likely to generate negative publicity. Because the main source of negative publicity is arguably civilian casualties, only attacks that carry the risk of affecting civilians

should be subject to strategic timing. We test this prediction using three alternative measures of whether an attack has an *ex ante* higher risk of civilian casualties: (1) the presence or absence of fatalities (*ex post*), (2) the type of weapon used (heavy weapons vs. light ammunition), and (3) whether the attack was carried out in a more vs. less densely populated area. Overall, 34.4% of Israeli military operations result in deaths; this frequency rises to 68% of attacks involving heavy weapons (e.g., missiles or artillery shells), and to 49.6% of attacks carried out in densely populated areas. We find that the relationship between occurrence and severity of attacks and news pressure is significant only for operations that result in fatalities, that involve the use of heavy weapons, and that are carried out in densely populated areas. The differences between the effects of news pressure on the timing of the targeted vs. nontargeted attacks and attacks with heavy vs. light weapons are statically significant. These findings are consistent with the prediction that only operations that are less costly to move in time and are more likely to generate negative publicity due to higher risk of civilian casualties are strategically timed to minimize media coverage.

Finally, we examine the mechanism behind the strategic timing effect. In particular, we test alternative explanations for why Israel should time its attacks to news pressure on the following day rather than on the same day. First, we test and reject the hypothesis that news coverage of the conflict on U.S. TV is "slow," i.e., that Israeli attacks are more likely to be covered by the news on the day after the attack than on the same day. We find that news about a particular Israeli attack can appear on the same day and on the following day; we also find that, on average, the probability of same-day coverage is 20% to 30% higher than that of next-day coverage. This suggests that, by timing its attacks strategically to newsworthy events, the Israeli government is trying to avoid a particular *type* of coverage, rather than trying to prevent any coverage at all. Using data on the length of each news story, we examine how much time U.S. news media devote to stories about Israeli attacks on the same day and on the following day. Though Israeli attacks are significantly more likely to make the news on the day of the attack than on the following day, the average length of conflict-related stories is not statistically different between the same day and the next day. This is because, when an attack is covered, conflict-related news appearing on the day after the attack tends to be longer, on average, than news appearing on the same day.

To investigate the differences in the news about Israeli attacks appearing on TV on same day vs. the next day, we coded the content of all news reports related to the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict on NBC and CNN between 2000 and 2011.[6] In particular, we collected data on both the *type* of information included in each news report and the *form* in which this information was presented. We find that the type of coverage of Israeli attacks differs substantially (and statistically significantly) between same-day and next-day reports. In particular, while the same-day and next-day news stories are equally likely to report information on the number of victims, news stories that appear on the day after the attack are much more likely to present personal stories of the civilian victims and include interviews with their relatives or friends. Furthermore, next-day coverage is significantly more likely to include emotionally charged visuals of burial processions and scenes of mourning. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these differences are driven both by technical aspects of news reporting in conflict zones and by local customs and traditions specific to the Middle East. It is easier and safer to get details of the story on the next day, and the next day provides an opportunity to produce emotionally charged videos of funerals.

As established by the cognitive and social psychology literatures, both the type of content (statistics vs. personal stories) and the form in which it is presented (narrative vs. visual) affect viewers: people react more strongly to personal stories than to statistics and facts (e.g., Borgida and Nisbett, 1977; Martin and Powers, 1982; Wilkins, 1983), and information transmitted only through words is less likely to be retained than information accompanied by images (e.g., Houghton and Willows, eds, 1987a,b; Mandl and Levin, eds, 1989; Houts et al., 2006). Taken together, our findings suggest that Israeli authorities behave strategically in timing their attacks to predictable international newsworthy events in order to minimize negative publicity and that this sophisticated strategy embraces both the technology of news reporting in war zones and the cognitive psychology of information transmission and retention.

Our research contributes to several strands of literature. First, our study contributes to the literature on political accountability and mass media (see, e.g., surveys by Prat and Stromberg, 2013; Sobbrio, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide systematic, empirical evidence that policy makers act strategically to minimize the negative impact of media by manipulating the timing of their actions. We also document the importance of qualitative aspects of news coverage, which most previous studies have overlooked. Second, our paper contributes to a growing body of work on the role of mass media in

[6] We focus on these two networks because they are the only ones for which videos of daily news are available in the Vanderbilt News Archive.

conflicts. While economists have largely focused on testing the role of mass media in fueling conflict (DellaVigna et al., 2014; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014; Adena et al., 2015), historians, political scientists, and international relations scholars have directly addressed the issue of how the media constrain behavior in a conflict environment and, more generally, influence foreign policy. For example, Mueller (1973); Sobel (2001); Baum (2004) and Canes-Wrone (2006) argue that, by shaping the public's views about military campaigns, mass media put pressure on politicians and constrains military decisions, especially when civilian casualties are involved. As a consequence, managing information that reaches the media has become a crucial part of military campaigns (Jensen, 2011). The military increasingly attempts to plan its strategy in anticipation of how audiences will react to media coverage of conflict (Adamson, 1997; Hjarvard, 2004, 2008; Silverstone, 2005; Maltby, 2012) and to control journalists' access to firsthand information by restricting access to conflict zones and using embedded reporters (e.g., Seethaler et al., eds, 2013). Our paper is the first to provide systematic empirical evidence in support of these arguments. Third, our paper contributes to the literature on strategic behavior in conflicts in general (Blattman and Miguel, 2010; Jackson and Morelli, 2009) and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular (e.g., Berrebi and Klor, 2008a,b; Jaeger and Paserman, 2006, 2008, 2009; Jaeger et al., 2010; Gould and Klor, 2010). Fourth, our findings are related to the finance literature on rational inattention and the strategic release of information, which investigates whether private companies release negative earnings reports in periods of low market attention (e.g., Patell and Wolfson, 1982; Damodaran, 1989; Doyle and Magilke, 2009; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; deHaan et al., 2015).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the results on the relationship between the timing of attacks and other newsworthy events, and section 5 provides evidence on the mechanism. Section 6 concludes.

2. Background: Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is ongoing and long-lasting. Fighting between Israelis and Palestinians, who at times have allied with Arab states, has continued with varying intensity since 1947.[7] Three major military campaigns—the 1948 War, the 1967 War (also known as the Six-Day War), and the 1973 War (also known as the Yom Kippur War)—shaped

[7] Smith (2007) and Tessler (2009) provide comprehensive historical accounts of the conflict.

the frontiers between the State of Israel and the occupied Palestinian Territories. In recent decades, the confrontations within the existing borders have occurred between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and a number of Palestinian militant groups, among which the biggest are the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (the military wing of Fatah), Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Continued diplomatic efforts by the international community, which most notably resulted in the 1993 Oslo I Accord and the 2000 Camp David Summit, have so far failed to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict.

The conflict has resulted in a very large number of victims. During our observation period alone—from September 29, 2000, to November 24, 2011—the conflict resulted in 7,690 fatalities were recorded, of whom 6,401 Palestinians and 1,289 Israelis.[8] Conflict intensity has varied considerably over time. The two episodes of the most intense fighting over our observation period were as follows. (1) The most intense fighting took place during Operation Cast Lead—a three-week assault launched by the Israelis on December 27, 2008 in response to Hamas rocket attacks on southern Israel—which resulted in the death of 1,349 Palestinians and 19 Israelis (21.6% of all fatalities during our 11-year sample period). (2) The most intense fighting took place in March 2002, when Israelis launched Operation Defensive Shield, a response to a Palestinian suicide bombing during Passover. 275 Palestinians and 70 Israelis were killed in this three-week period. Figure 1 presents the monthly fatalities on both sides of the conflict for the entire sample period (plot 1) and excluding the Gaza War (plot 2), with shaded areas indicating the two operations noted above. Once we exclude the Gaza War from the sample, it is evident that our sample period covers two distinct phases of the conflict characterized by very different conflict intensity: the Second Intifada (from the beginning of the sample period to February 8, 2005) and the post-Intifada period (from February 9, 2005, onward).[9] This difference is highlighted by the horizontal lines representing the average monthly number of fatalities on both sides of the conflict separately for the two periods; the death toll is much higher during the Second Intifada.[10]

Two characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are especially important for our story. First, the conflict resulted in a relatively high number of civilian victims, particularly children: 47% of all Palestinian casualties and 68% of all Israeli casualties were civilians;

[8] The fatalities tall excludes the suicide bombers involved in terrorist attacks.

[9] The Second Intifada ended with an agreement signed by Mahmoud Abbas and Ariel Sharon at the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit.

[10] We exclude the Gaza War period (as an outlier) from our baseline sample and verify that the main results are robust to using the full sample with the Gaza War.

21% of Palestinian casualties and 11% Israeli casualties were children. Second, the conflict has traditionally attracted significant attention from international media and, especially, from U.S. media both in absolute terms and relative to the number of victims (Hawkins, 2008). Over our observation period, on average, 34 minutes per month were devoted to the conflict during the evening news on NBC, ABC, CBS, and CNN.

3. Data sources and main variables

In our empirical analysis, we use daily data on (1) all attacks carried out by both sides of the conflict, including the date, the number of victims, and various characteristics of the attacks; (2) all stories that appeared on evening U.S. TV news, including information on their order, length, and topic, and, for all conflict-related stories, information on various qualitative attributes of the news reports based on detailed video content analysis; (3) the timing of events from the forward-looking political calendar in the United States and the timing of important sports events; (4) the volume of Google searches about the conflict; and (5) the occurrence of natural and human-induced disasters. Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table A.2 in the online appendix.

3.1. Data on attacks

Data on attacks by Israelis and Palestinians come from two sources: the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights, *B'Tselem* (http://www.btselem.org/) and the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, UNOCHA (http://www.ochaopt.org/).

The *B'Tselem* dataset covers the period between September 29, 2000, and November 24, 2011. It contains information on every attack by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) or Palestinian militants that resulted in fatalities. For each attack the data include information on the day of the attack, whether it was conducted by Palestinian militants or the IDF, the number of fatalities, and some information about the victims. For attacks by the Israeli military, there is information on whether the attack was a special targeted-killing operation against a specific top-level Palestinian terrorist. Additional information regarding the location of the attack, the type of weapon used, and whether the victim participated in the hostilities is available only for a subset of observations.

The UNOCHA dataset covers the period between January 3, 2005, and November 24,

2011, almost entirely during the post-Intifada period. It covers only attacks by Israeli forces, including those that resulted in nonfatal casualties, and includes comprehensive information on the location of each attack and the type of the weapon used.

We aggregate the data from each of these two sources by date and attacker. Hence, we construct daily time series for the following variables: (1) the occurrence of attacks by each side of the conflict, (2) the number of fatal and nonfatal casualties caused by each side's attacks, (3) the occurrence of attacks involving the use of heavy vs. light weapons, and (4) the location of the attacks in areas with population density above and below the sample median. The information on occurrence and severity of deadly attacks is available for the entire period (between 2000 and 2011). Other variables are defined for the shorter period (between 2005 and 2011). To differentiate attacks by the type of weapon used, we define the following weapons as heavy weapons: all types of missiles (airplane missile, helicopter missile, surface-to-surface rocket), sound bombs, explosives, tank shells, shock grenades. We define the following weapons as light weapons: live ammunition, physical assaults, rubber-coated metal bullets, and tear gas.

3.2. Data on U.S. news and the measurement of news pressure

3.2.1. News coverage of the conflict

We compute various measures of daily news coverage of conflict events. Daily data on evening TV news broadcasts on the top four U.S. networks—NBC, ABC, CBS, and CNN—are available from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive for the 2000–2011 period.[11] We identify all stories devoted to Israeli-Palestinian conflict and construct the following variables: a dummy for whether at least one conflict-related story appears on NBC, ABC, or CBS, and the total length of conflict-related news stories appearing on these three networks on a given day, as well as a dummy for and the length of conflict-related news on all four networks, including CNN.

3.2.2. News-pressure measures

For each day and each network, the following information is available for every story featured on the evening news: the order of appearance, the length in seconds, and a summary

[11] Data on Fox News are available for a much shorter period of time.

of the topic. We use this information to construct a measure of the presence of other important newsworthy events that are not related to any Israeli or Palestinian actions and that may crowd out news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In contrast to CNN, which features news around the clock, NBC, ABC, and CBS have a well-defined, 30-minute time slot allocated to evening news. As Eisensee and Stromberg (2007) point out, the fact that this time slot is limited to 30 minutes allows us to measure the importance of newsworthy events featured on the broadcasts: more important stories appear before less important stories, and they are longer.[12] Following Eisensee and Stromberg (2007), we define "news pressure" as the time devoted to the top three news stories that are unrelated to Israel or Palestine in the evening newscast on NBC, ABC and CBS, the three networks with 30-minute evening editions.

We construct two alternative measures of news pressure: (1) the "uncorrected news pressure" and (2) the "corrected news pressure" (or, simply, "news pressure"). For each day and each network, we identify the news stories that refer to Israel or Palestine, i.e., stories whose summaries contain the words *Israel*, *Palestine*, *Gaza*, *West Bank*, or *Hamas*, or any words with related roots. When no story in a given newscast refers to Israel or Palestine, both news-pressure measures are set to be equal to the time devoted to the top three stories, i.e., the first three presented stories. When one or more stories refer to Israel or Palestine during the broadcast, the "uncorrected news pressure" is set to be equal to the first three presented stories that are not related to Israel or Palestine.[13] For the "corrected news pressure," we adjust the units of measurement to account for the fact that the time devoted to all other stories is automatically reduced by the time allocated to the Israel-or-Palestine-related stories. On the days with news about Israel or Palestine, we set the "corrected news pressure" equal to the length of the top three non-Israel-or-Palestine-related stories, divided by the time allocated to all non-Israel-or-Palestine-related stories, and multiplied by the total length of the newscast. This procedure allows to have comparable units across days when Israel or Palestine are and are not featured in the news. Even though the evening news broadcasts are limited to 30 minutes, the actual length of time devoted to the news varies somewhat

[12] The most likely reason for this is the competition between networks for audience: if one broadcast covers less important news first, it will lose audience to a competitor that covers more important news at the same time.

[13] The list of news stories about Israel or Palestine is substantially larger than the list of news about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, because the former includes any news on politics, culture, tourism, and so on. We exclude all stories in any way related to Israel or Palestine from the measures of news pressure to avoid reverse causality.

from one day to the next, and the weather forecast fills the rest of the time. Our results are completely unaffected by whether we adjust the length of the top-three news stories by the actual length of the news that day minus the time devoted to Israel-Palestine stories or by the median length of time devoted to news on the particular network, again, minus the time devoted to Israel-Palestine stories.[14]

Table A.1 in the online appendix illustrates how we computed both measures of daily news pressure for a specific network when Israel-or-Palestine-related content is present and absent from the newscast. To aggregate information across networks, we compute the median of the network-specific news-pressure measures on that day. Finally, we convert units of measurement for both daily news-pressure variables from seconds to 10 minutes.

As reported in Table A.2 in the online appendix, the daily (corrected) news pressure ranges from 2.3 to 29.3 minutes and the uncorrected news pressure ranges from 0.2 minutes to to 29.3 minutes. The correlation coefficient between the two measures is 0.968, as they take on exactly the same value when conflict-related news is not featured. Figure A.2 in the online appendix shows that the distribution of both news-pressure measures is substantially skewed to the right. The distance between the median and the 90th percentile is almost twice as large as between the median and the 10th percentile of the distribution.

3.2.3. The relationship between news-pressure measures and news on conflict

As our aim is to estimate how the timing of the attacks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is related to the presence of other newsworthy events proxied by news pressure, we need to understand whether and how the presence of conflict-related news affects the news-pressure measures. This is important, because any correlation between news pressure and the presence of news on conflict would bias our estimation.

To study the relationship between the presence of conflict-related news and the two news-pressure measures, we develop a simple theoretical framework. Suppose, for simplicity, that there is only one TV network. Let us denote the time allocated to this TV network's top three news stories by x when the conflict is not featured on the newscast. y is the time allocated to the remaining (non-top-three) stories when the conflict is not on the news. $\widetilde{x}$ and

[14] Data on the news content are missing for 68 days over our sample period. To avoid gaps in the sample, we assign the predicted values to each news-pressure measure on these days from a regression of news pressure on its 20 lags and day of the week, month and year fixed effects, estimated on the entire sample with nonmissing values. All results in the paper are robust to excluding from the sample the days for which original news data are not available.

$\widetilde{y}$ are the times allocated to the top three stories and the remaining stories, respectively, when a conflict-related story is on the news. c is the time allocated to a conflict-related story if it appears on the news. Suppose that all these time variables are measured in minutes and the total length of the newscast is 30 minutes. P^U is the "uncorrected news pressure" ; it is set to be equal to the length in minutes of the top three nonconflict stories.[15] P is the "corrected news pressure," which, by definition, is equal to the length of the top three nonconflict stories divided by the time allocated to all nonconflict stories and multiplied by the total time of the newscast. When there is no news on conflict, i.e., when $x+y=30$, the two news-pressure measures are equal, i.e., $P^U = P = x$. In contrast, when conflict-related news is featured in the broadcast, i.e., when $\widetilde{x}+\widetilde{y}+c=30$, the two news-pressure measures take on different values: $P^U = \widetilde{x}$; $P = \frac{30\widetilde{x}}{\widetilde{x}+\widetilde{y}}$.

Suppose a conflict story, worthy of c minutes, arrives in the news room and everything else is held constant. To fit this story into the newscast, the editor needs to adjust the time of other news stories. The following theorem states what the arrival of conflict news implies for the magnitude of P^U and P.

Theorem 1.

Editorial policy determines whether and how the news-pressure measures are affected by the arrival of news about conflict and by the increase in length of the news on conflict.

1. *The corrected news pressure is unaffected by the arrival of news about conflict and by increase in its length if and only if the editor reduces the time allocated to all other stories proportionally to their length, i.e.,* $\frac{dP}{dc} = 0$ *iff* $\frac{\widetilde{x}}{x} = \frac{\widetilde{y}}{y}$.

2. *The corrected news pressure decreases with the arrival of conflict news and with the increase in their length if and only if the top three nonconflict-related news stories get a disproportionally larger reduction in time coverage than the nonconflict-related news outside top three, i.e.,* $\frac{dP}{dc} < 0$ *iff* $\frac{\widetilde{x}}{x} < \frac{\widetilde{y}}{y}$.

3. *The corrected news pressure increases with the arrival of conflict news if and only if the nonconflict-related news stories outside top thee get a disproportionally larger reduction in time coverage than the top three nonconflict-related news stories, i.e.,* $\frac{dP}{dc} > 0$ *iff* $\frac{\widetilde{x}}{x} > \frac{\widetilde{y}}{y}$.

[15] Without loss of generality, we assume that all Israel and Palestine related news stories are about conflict.

4. *The uncorrected news pressure never increases in magnitude when news about conflict arrive, i.e.,* $\frac{dP^U}{dc} \leq 0$.

5. *The uncorrected news pressure is unaffected by the arrival of conflict news if and only if the time is allocated to the conflict story at the expense of non-top three stories only, i.e.,* $\frac{dP^U}{dc} = 0$ *iff* $x = \widetilde{x}$ *and* $\widetilde{y} = y - c$.

We provide the proof of this theorem and numerical examples to illustrate each of the cases considered by the theorem in the online appendix.

Theorem 1 shows that, depending on the editorial policy, if conflict news arrives and nothing else changes, the corrected news pressure P could remain constant, go up or go down; whereas the uncorrected news pressure P^U could only go down or remain constant. Thus, one should expect the estimated relationship between such newsworthy conflict events as attacks, on the one hand, and the news pressure, on the other hand, to be biased downwards when the uncorrected news-pressure measure is used. The sign of the bias of the corrected news-pressure measure needs to be determined. We can test for the direction of the bias using Theorem 1, under the assumption that the editorial policy is constant over time. By estimating the causal relationship between news pressure P and the length of news about conflict c, we can establish the sign of the derivative $\frac{dP}{dc}$. We use the two episodes of the highest intensity of conflict, namely, the Gaza War and Operation Defensive Shield, as well as the difference in the intensity of conflict between the Second Intifada and the post-Intifada period as a source of exogenous variation in the length of conflict-related news. This variation is exogenous because an increase in the intensity of fighting during these episodes was orthogonal to other newsworthy events in the world. We construct a variable that takes a value of 2 during Operation Defensive Shield and Operation Cast Lead (i.e., the Gaza War), a value of 1 during the Second Intifada (outside the days of the Operations Defensive Shield), and a value of zero in all other days, and we use it as an instrument for the length of conflict-related news, c. Using this instrument, we estimate 2SLS regressions with P and P^U as dependent variables and c as the main explanatory variable. To control for the seasonality of the news, we include calendar month and day-of-the-week fixed effects. In addition, to control for the macro time trend, we control for year dummies. Table 1 presents the results. We find that, on average, $\frac{dP}{dc} = 0$ and confirm that $\frac{dP^U}{dc} < 0$. Panel A considers the whole sample, and Panel B considers the subsample of days with an attack on the same or the previous day. The first column presents the first stage: we find that, during the periods of intense fighting, news stories

about conflict were significantly longer, and the instrument is a strong predictor of c in both samples. The F-statistics for the excluded instrument are 14 and 18, respectively. Columns 2 and 4 present the results of the OLS regressions for P and P^U, respectively, in which we find negative coefficients on the length of conflict-related news for both variables in both samples. These coefficients are statistically significant, with the exception of the regression for the corrected news pressure in the full sample where the p-value of estimated coefficient equals 0.13. The coefficients of OLS regressions reflect causality going both ways; namely, the signs of derivatives of $\frac{dP}{dc}$ and $\frac{dP^U}{dc}$, which we want to estimate here, and the crowding out of the conflict-related news by other important newsworthy events, the relationship, first noted by Eisensee and Stromberg (2007), which is the reason to consider news pressure in the analysis. Columns 3 and 5 present the second-stages, which causally estimate the derivatives of P and P^U with respect to c. We find zero effect for the corrected news pressure and a negative and significant effect for uncorrected news pressure in both samples.

Applying Theorem 1 under the assumption of constant editorial policy, we conclude that, on average, upon the arrival of conflict-related news (and an increase in the length of conflict-related news), the editor reduces the time allocated to all other stories proportionally to their length. This implies a significant mechanical downward bias for the uncorrected news pressure and no mechanical bias for corrected news pressure in estimating the relationship between attacks on both sides of the conflict and newsworthy events, measured by news pressure. Henceforth, we refer to corrected news pressure simply as news pressure, as we consider it our baseline measure. We report results of our main specifications using uncorrected news pressure as well. As a robustness exercise, we also report results using news pressure calculated with the three longest stories rather than the first three stories.

3.2.4. Content analysis of conflict-related videos

To test for the mechanism behind the relationship between news pressure and the timing of attacks, we collected data on the actual content of all conflict-related news stories for two networks, CNN and NBC, from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive. We first identified all 755 news stories on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict featured during our observation period. We then asked independent analysts to code the content of each of these videos by completing a 23-question questionnaire. The aim of the questionnaire was to evaluate several dimensions of each conflict-related video: (1) whether it describes a particular attack, and

if so, whether it reports specific facts about the attack (i.e., location, weapon used, number of victims, including civilians), (2) whether it features personal information about the victims, interviews with their relatives or friends, and interviews with witnesses; (3) whether it includes footage of the aftermath of the attack, images of the victims' burials, and scenes of mourning; and (4) whether it reports official reactions by Israeli or Palestinian authorities. Table A.3 in the online appendix contains the full list of questions and the summary statistics of the responses. Of the 755 videos, 428 are related to specific attacks that occurred on the same day or the previous day. We use these data to analyze the differences in content of news stories appearing on the day of the attacks and on the following day.

3.3. Data on Political and Sports events

To analyze how the timing of the attacks is related to predictable newsworthy events, we compiled a list of important political and sports events. First, we used the dates of all key U.S. political events that were announced in a forward-looking U.S. political calendar (http://www.politics1.com/calendar.htm, accessed on October 30, 2015). To get information for the past years, we use historical snapshots of forward-looking political calendar stored in the Wayback Machine (https://archive.org/web/, accessed on October 30, 2015). The list covers the following types of political events: presidential inaugurations, general elections, presidential primaries, presidential caucuses, national party conventions, State of the Union addresses, start-of-congress sessions, special congressional and senate elections, gubernatorial elections, statewide elections, and state primaries. To understand which of these events create news pressure, we regress daily news pressure on the dummy for each event type, controlling for day-of-the-week, calendar-month, and year fixed effects. Column 1 of Table A.4 in the online appendix presents the results. We find that news pressure increases substantially on the days of presidential inaugurations, general elections, national party conventions, State of the Union addresses, Iowa caucuses, other presidential caucuses, New Hampshire presidential primaries, and Super Tuesdays, but not on other presidential caucuses.[16] Other events from the list do not significantly affect news pressure.

Our aim was to compile a list of exogenous events that could only affect the timing of the attacks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through their effect on news pressure. Thus,

[16] The coefficients on dummies for some of these events when considered separately are imprecisely estimated because there are too few of them in the sample; grouped together, all of them significantly increase news pressure.

any events that involved U.S. politicians commenting on U.S. foreign policy, in particular on the relationship between the United States and Israel or Palestine, would be eliminated from this list due to the excludability restriction. Ten of 11 State of the Union addresses in our sample included commentary on foreign policy, and six explicitly mentioned the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During all six national party conventions, politicians gave speeches on foreign policy; during all but one, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was discussed. Other events from this list seem to have no relation to the conflict; therefore, we keep them in the list of exogenous newsworthy events.

Next, we explore whether lags and leads of exogenous political events are also an important source of news pressure (column 2 of Table A.4). For example, during election coverage, we expect the media to discuss campaigns before elections, and results after elections. We find that general elections create news pressure during five days around the event, that New Hampshire presidential primaries and Super Tuesdays create news pressure during three days around the event, but that presidential inaugurations and presidential caucuses are newsworthy only on the day they occur.

We also collected dates of major U.S. and world sports events. Like our strategy for political events, we regress news pressure on the dummy for days of each important sports event, controlling for day-of-the-week, calendar-month, and year fixed effects. Column 3 of Table A.4 shows that only the FIFA World Cup has a significant positive effect on news pressure, after controlling for seasonality. As a result, we create a single dummy for the major political and sports events, combining the important lags and leads of exogenous political events with the days of the FIFA World Cup. The major events dummy is switched on during 159 days over our sample period. The last column of Table A.4 presents the relationship between the major events dummy and the news pressure.

3.4. Data on disasters

To verify that attacks do not coincide with unpredictable news, we also use data on the occurrence of disasters in the United States. A comprehensive list of disasters, both natural and manmade, for the period of interest is available from the International Disasters Dataset (IDD), compiled by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the Catholic University of Louvain. We focus on disasters occurring in the United States that resulted in a relatively high number of victims. We focus on U.S. disasters for two

reasons: they are more likely to be covered by U.S. news media, and they are unrelated to terrorism activity in the Middle East (Berrebi and Ostwald, 2011). For each disaster, we use the following information: the starting date, the type of disaster, and the number of fatalities. We compile a list of all U.S. disasters that fall into the top 50% of the distribution of the number of fatalities among disasters of the same type. In all, 106 such disasters occurred from 2000 to 2011.

3.5. Data on Google searches

To construct a daily measure of the U.S. public's interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we collect data on the daily volume of conflict-related searches on Google. *Google Trends* provides high-frequency data on the volume of Google searches for specific queries from 2004 to the present. We focus on all searches on the *search topic*: "Israeli-Palestinian conflict," as defined by Google. When measuring the volume of searches for any particular search topic, Google algorithms count many different search queries (i.e., search terms or expressions) that relate to the same search topic. Google Trends reports a measure of the daily volume of searches for each search topic normalized by the highest search volume recorded over a maximum-three-month interval of interest. No data are available on the absolute number of searches. Hence, comparing daily search volumes for the same topic in different three-month periods requires rescaling of the data using a common scale defined over the global timeframe. We used a single data series for the search volume at weekly (rather than daily) frequency for the entire seven-year period, which are available in *Google Trends*, to bring the 32 separate daily three-month-long series to the same scale. As a result, we were able to construct a daily measure of the search volume for the search topic "Israeli-Palestinian conflict" for the period between January 2004 and November 2011.

4. Are attacks timed to news pressure?

4.1. News about the conflict on U.S. TV

Before testing our main hypothesis, we provide suggestive evidence in favor of its main premises. In particular, we verify that U.S. TV news media cover important attacks of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that the unrelated-to-Israel-or-Palestine news pressure is associated with less coverage of the conflict, and that conflict-related TV news is associated with

higher public attention to the conflict.

The first two columns of Table 2 confirm that the attacks get coverage on U.S. evening newscasts. We estimate time-series regressions in which we relate the dummy for any news on the conflict and the number of minutes devoted to the conflict daily to whether an Israeli or Palestinian deadly attack occurred on the same day or on the previous day, controlling for year, calendar-month, and day-of-the-week fixed effects. When the dependent variable is the dummy, we estimate an OLS model (column 1), and when the dependent variable is the length of conflict-related news, we estimate a maximum likelihood (ML) negative binomial model (column 2), as the count data exhibit overdispersion. We find that, on average, a fatal attacks by the Israel Defense Forces and fatal attacks by Palestinians against Israelis have a 10% and an 11% chance to appear in the news, respectively. Fatal Israeli attacks increase the length of these stories by a factor of 2.6 compared to days with no Israeli attacks when, on average, 0.2 minutes are devoted to the conflict.[17] Fatal Palestinian attacks are associated with a 97% increase in the length of these stories (from a baseline of 0.5 minutes). Panel A of Figure 2 illustrates these findings by showing the predicted length of news stories about conflict on days with and without Israeli and Palestinian attacks.[18]

In columns 3 and 4 of Table 2, we illustrate that, conditional on the severity of the attacks, news pressure has a negative significant association with the conflict coverage. We focus on those days when an attack by either side occurred on the same day or the previous day and regress our measures of conflict-related coverage on daily news pressure, controlling for the $log(1+)$ of the number of victims, and the three sets of fixed effects described above. We use the corrected news-pressure measure because, on average, it has no mechanical association with news about the conflict. As above, we estimate OLS for the presence

[17] When there are no Israeli attacks, the conflict-related news stories cover other issues, such as Palestinian attacks or peace process negotiations.

[18] Israeli attacks are more frequent and more deadly. During our observation period, the number of Israeli military attacks against Palestinians is 5.7 times larger than the number of Palestinian attacks against Israelis. On average, an Israeli attack causes four fatal casualties and a Palestinian attack causes 2.3 casualties. The fact that U.S. news media cover Palestinian attacks more in terms of length of coverage (one minute, on average, compared to half a minute) is consistent with several explanations. It could be related to the difference in the frequency of the attacks between the two sides, as the overall time allocated to all Israeli attacks on evening news is substantially greater than that for all Palestinian attacks: 18.9 vs. 8.8 minutes per month, on average, over our observation period, and 40.3 vs. 21.0 minutes per month during the Second Intifada. As we discuss below, it could also be related to Israel's effort to inform international journalists about the Palestinian terrorist attacks and to create favorable conditions, both in terms of access and security, for the journalists to film the aftermath of these attacks (Nevo and Shur, eds, 2003). Finally, it could also be related to a pro-Israeli bias of U.S. media.

of conflict-related news in broadcast and a ML negative binomial model for the length of conflict-related stories. We find that an increase in news pressure by four minutes (equivalent to a shift in the distribution of news pressure from the median to the 90th percentile or to a shift from the 75th to the 95th percentile) is associated with a decrease in the probability of any news on conflict being reported of 3.2 percentage points (roughly a 32% decrease relative to the baseline probability estimated in column 1) and a decrease in the length of conflict-related stories by 25%. Panel B of Figure 2 illustrates how the length of conflict coverage is related to news pressure during days with an attack on that day or the day before.

In columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 we present evidence that the U.S. public is interested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and that the coverage of the conflict on U.S. TV news is associated with an increase in the interest of the U.S. public in the conflict. The daily volume of Google searches in the United States for the search topic "Israeli-Palestinian conflict" is significantly higher when the severity of Israeli attacks increases (column 5). The search volume is also significantly higher when news on conflict appears on U.S. TV conditional on the severity of attacks on both sides of the conflict (column 6). Five minutes' worth of conflict-related stories is associated with a twofold increase in the volume of Google searchers. This association, however, is likely to be driven by unobserved characteristics of the conflict events that simultaneously affect the interest of the public and of the journalists reporting on the conflict.

4.2. Testing the main hypothesis

4.2.1. Attacks and news pressure

Our main hypothesis is that Israeli authorities choose the timing of their operations to coincide with other newsworthy events that may crowd out news coverage of the attacks in order to avoid the negative publicity associated with possible collateral damage, in particular with civilian victims. In contrast, as we discussed in the introduction, the prediction about the relationship between news pressure and the timing of Palestinian attacks is ambiguous. In this subsection, we use the measures of news pressure on U.S. TV as a proxy for the presence of competing newsworthy events; in the next subsection, we rely on exogenous variation in news pressure stemming from the timing of political and sports events.

We start with a very flexible specification. We regress daily measures of the occurrence and severity of the attacks by each side of the conflict on lags and leads of U.S. news

pressure, controlling for seasonality, overall conflict intensity, and the presence of retaliation motive (Jaeger and Paserman, 2008, 2009). In particular, we estimate equations of the following general form:

$$A_{it} = \alpha_0 P_t + \beta_0 P_{t+1} + \sum_{\tau=1}^{7} \alpha_\tau P_{t-\tau} + \sum_{\tau=2}^{7} \beta_\tau P_{t+\tau} + \gamma_1 A_{j_{-1}} + \gamma_2 A_{j_{-7}} + \gamma_3 A_{j_{-14}} + \eta_{d_t} + \psi_{m_t} + \vartheta_{y_t} + \varepsilon_{it}. \tag{1}$$

A_{it} is a measure of the occurrence or the intensity of an attack by side i (either Israel Defense Forces or Palestinian militants) against the opposing side j on day t. P_t is one of our alternative measures of news pressure on day t. We focus on the effect of same-day and next-day news pressure with and without controls for a series of its lags and leads. $A_{j_{-1}}$, $A_{j_{-7}}$, and $A_{j_{-14}}$ are dummies for the occurrence of attacks by side j one day before day t, between two and seven days before day t, and between eight and fourteen days before day t, respectively. These dummies capture the need for retaliation following an attack by the opposing side. η_{d_t}, ψ_{m_t}, and ϑ_{y_t} denote fixed effects for each day of the week, each calendar month, and each year, respectively. As both attacks and news pressure are serially correlated, we estimate standard errors with Newey-West estimator. We estimate all regressions on the sample of all days in our observation period, excluding September 11, 2001, for which news pressure is undefined because evening newscasts on that day far exceeded 30 minutes, and the three weeks of the extraordinarily intense fighting during the Operation Cast Lead (the Gaza War, 12/27/2008 – 01/18/2009).

The estimation of a series of regressions, which have the form of equation 1, yields that the Israeli deadly attacks and their severity robustly and significantly positively associated with the two measures of news pressure on the day following the attack, i.e., β_0 is positive and significant, and the Palestinian deadly attacks do not have a robust relationship with the level news pressure. First, we illustrate these findings graphically. Figure 3 plots the coefficients on the lags and leads of news pressure around $t+1$ from estimating equation 1 with OLS using both measures of news pressure as the main explanatory variable and the dummy for occurrence of attacks on both sides of the conflict as dependent variables. Figure A.3 presents similar plots based on regressions where lags and leads of the measures of news pressure are included in the regressions one by one instead of simultaneously. The figures show that at $t+1$ the estimated effect of both measures of news pressure on the probability of an Israeli attack is positive and statistically significant and the coefficients for Palestinian

attacks are precisely estimated zeros.

Tables 3 and 4 present the results formally. Table 3 focuses on the Israeli attacks against Palestinians. Panel A presents the results for the baseline (i.e., corrected) measure of news pressure. In the first three columns, we estimate a linear probability model with the dummy for occurrence of a fatal Israeli attack on a given day as the dependent variable. In the following four columns, we focus on the severity of Israeli attacks: columns 4 to 6 present results of the OLS estimation using the $log(1+)$ of the number of fatalities of Israeli attacks on a given day as the dependent variable. In column 7, we use the number of fatalities and estimate the maximum likelihood negative binomial regression, more appropriate for overdispersed outcome variables.

Columns 1 and 4 present the contemporaneous relationship between Israeli attacks and news pressure conditional only on day-of-the-week, calendar-month, and year fixed effects. The results indicate that both the timing and the intensity of Israeli attacks are positively correlated with the baseline measure of news pressure on the same day. However, the effect of contemporaneous news pressure on Israeli attacks on the same day almost completely disappears if we include the news pressure on the following day in the list of covariates; in contrast, the coefficient on tomorrow's news pressure on today's attacks is positive and statistically significant. We present these results in columns 2 and 5. The pairwise correlation between news pressure and its lag is 0.56. The inclusion of seven lags eliminates the residual autocorrelation entirely. Thus, in columns 3 and 6, we include seven lags of news pressure; and, in addition, we add controls for retaliation motive. The effect of news pressure at $t+1$ on the occurrence and severity of Israeli attacks on day t remains positive and statistically significant with the inclusion of these controls. This effect is robust to including additional six leads of news pressure, as shown in Figure 3. All the lags and leads of news pressure taken together are jointly significant at 10% level, and all the leads beyond the news pressure at $t+1$ are jointly insignificant.[19]

Panel B of Table 3 presents the same regressions, but with uncorrected news pressure. As discussed above, we expect the coefficients on the uncorrected news pressure to be biased

[19] In specification for occurrence of Israeli attacks as the dependent variable with controls for the seven lags of news pressure, the coefficient on the fourth lag of news pressure is positive and signifiant at the 10% level. However, this is not robust to using any of the measures of severity of Israeli attacks: the *log* (number of fatalities +1) with OLS or the number of victims with ML negative binomial estimation. Thus, we conclude that the 10% significance of this coefficient is within the margin of statistical error as we estimate many parameters.

downwards for days when attacks are covered by the news. (Below we show that attacks do get coverage both on the same day and on the following day). Despite a significant negative bias, we find no effect of uncorrected news pressure on the day of the attack (t) and a positive effect on the day following the attack $(t+1)$. The latter is statistically significant in all but one specification, which considers log number of victims and includes all lags (column 6). However, a more appropriate model for overdispersed data yields statistically significant coefficient (column 7). Thus, we conclude that this result is robust to using uncorrected news pressure. As one would expect due to the negative bias, the magnitudes of the coefficients both on the same day and on the next day for the uncorrected news pressure are substantially smaller, whereas the standard errors are of similar magnitude.

Regarding the magnitude of the effect: holding everything else constant, a four-minute increase in baseline measure of news pressure increases the probability of an Israeli attack on the previous day by 3 percentage points (equal to 8% of the probability of an attack on an average day) and increases the death toll of Israeli attacks by 21% from a base level of 1.25 fatalities per day (according to the estimates in columns 3 and 7 of Panel A). As we show below, these magnitudes are substantially smaller than the true unbiased estimates, because they are subject to a severe attenuation bias due to a measurement error in the news-pressure variable. Israel could only time its attacks to predictable newsworthy events, whereas news pressure is comprised of news about both predictable and unpredictable events. The unpredictable component of news pressure creates a classical measurement error and biases the point estimates towards zero. We address this issue in the next subsection.

Table 4 has exactly the same structure as Table 3, but it presents results for the attacks by Palestinian militants against Israelis. We find no evidence of any relationship between the timing of the fatal Palestinian attacks and the baseline measure of news pressure (Panel A). The coefficients on the news pressure on the day of the attack or on the following day are statistically insignificant individually as well as jointly with other lags and/or leads of news pressure. Some of the coefficients on lags or leads occasionally reach statistical significance, but these effects are not robust to changes in the set of covariates or the choice of dependent variable and estimation model, in contrast to the robust effect for Israeli attacks. Simultaneous estimation of equations for Israeli and Palestinian attacks using seemingly unrelated regressions yields that the difference between the point estimates of β_0 in the two equations is statistically significant. We report p-values for the test of equality of β_0 from Panel A of

Table 3 and β_0 from Panel A of Table 4 at the bottom of Panel A of Table 4.[20] Panel B of Table 4 shows that, consistent with a negative mechanical bias in estimating the coefficients of interest with uncorrected news pressure, the estimated same-day effect of uncorrected news pressure is negative and in specifications without lags as additional controls statistically significant.

4.2.2. Robustness of the relationship between Israeli attacks and news pressure

The relationship between the timing of Israeli attacks and the next-day news pressure is not driven by the choice of the functional form or the list of covariates. Figure A.4 in the online appendix presents a bivariate nonparametric relationship between the occurrence of Israeli attacks or their severity and news pressure on the following day. The vertical lines on each plot indicate the median of news pressure (8.3 minutes) and the 99th percentile of its distribution (17 minutes). The picture shows that the unconditional relationship is positive for the larger part of the distribution. This is corroborated by Figure A.5 in the online appendix, which plots the frequency and severity of the Israeli attacks by quintiles of the distribution of next-day news pressure.

In Table A.5 in the online appendix, we show that the results presented in Panel A of Table 3 are robust to controlling for the seven lags of the dependent variable (as attacks themselves are serially correlated), to using the whole sample including the Gaza War, excluding contemporaneous news pressure and its lags, including additional leads of news pressure, and clustering error term by month$\times$year instead of using Newy-West standard errors. Furthermore, Table A.6 in the online appendix replicates Table 3, controlling for additional 24 dummies for various Muslim and Jewish holidays; Table A.7 in the online appendix establishes robustness to using corrected news pressure based on the three longest news stories rather than the first three news stories. Tables A.8 and Table A.9 in the online appendix show that the effect of next-day news pressure is not driven by any one of the four Israeli administrations or three American administrations in power during our observation period: the effect was significantly higher during the Ehud Barak and Bill Clinton administrations, but it is statistically significant excluding them; there are no other significant differences

[20] An auxiliary result of our analysis is that the retaliation motive is important for both Palestinians and Israelis. The only group of regressors that is significant in explaining Palestinian attacks is the retaliation-motive dummies (see columns 3, 6 and 7 of Table 4). The retaliation motive is even more pronounced for Israeli attacks (columns 3, 6 and 7 of Table 3).

between administrations. Finally, in Table A.10, we show that there is no significant difference between the effects of next-day news pressure between the Second Intifada and the post-Intifada period. In this table we also examine whether the effect of the next-day news pressure is significantly different during peace talks and peace processes. We find no significant differences, with the exception of a significantly lower β_0 during peace processes for the number of victims of Israeli attacks; however, this is not robust to using occurrence of Israeli attacks as a dependent variable.

4.2.3. THE TIMING OF ATTACKS AND OTHER NEWSWORTHY EVENTS

The main result established in the previous two subsections, namely a robust association between news pressure and the timing of Israeli attacks and no association between news pressure and Palestinian attacks, is subject to classical measurement-error bias due to an unpredictable component of news pressure. It could also be biased because of endogeneity: both news pressure and important events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be driven by a third unobserved variable. For instance, important events in the Iraq war may have affected Israeli strategy through a change in geopolitical equilibrium in the Middle East, and they directly affected news pressure in the United States. To address these (potential) biases, we use the exogenous variation in news pressure stemming from news coverage of important political and sports events, as described in section 3.3. In Figure 4, we summarize the frequency of attacks by each side of the conflict separately for the subsamples of days that do and do not coincide with newsworthy political and sports events. The frequency of Israeli attacks is 14.5 percentage points (37.4%) higher on average on the days that coincide with important political and sports events compared to the baseline frequency of 38.7% on the days that do not coincide with major political and sports events. The frequency of Palestinian attacks does not differ between the two groups of days. More formally, we estimate the following equation with 2SLS:

$$A_{it} = \beta_0^{IV} P_{t+1} + \gamma_1 A_{j_{-1}} + \gamma_2 A_{j_{-7}} + \gamma_3 A_{j_{-14}} + \eta_{d_t} + \psi_{m_t} + \vartheta_{y_t} + \varepsilon_{it}, \tag{2}$$

where the next-day news pressure P_{t+1} is instrumented by the first lead of dummy for major political and sports events. We use a more parsimonious specification in the instrumental variable analysis, because we have no independent instruments for the contemporaneous

news pressure and its lead. Consistent with the unconditional relationship presented in Figure 4, we find a very strong positive relationship for Israeli attacks and no relationship for Palestinian attacks.

Table 5 presents the results: Panel A – for Israeli attacks and Panel B – for Palestinian attacks. Columns 1 and 2 present the first-stage relationships for the two measures of news pressure (baseline and uncorrected). As presented in the data section, the instrument is a very strong predictor of news pressure: news pressure is, on average, 1.8 minutes higher during days that coincide with the political and sports events that we consider. Columns 3, 4, 6, and 7 report the results of the second stage for the occurrence and the severity of the attacks. We find a strong positive and significant effect of both corrected and uncorrected news-pressure measures instrumented by important political and sports events on the timing and severity of Israeli attacks and no significant effect on Palestinian attacks.[21] Columns 5 and 8 present the results of the reduced form, in which we regress the attacks on both sides of the conflict and their severity on the dummy for days that coincide with important political and sports events. The results are similar to the second stage. We also estimate a simultaneous system of equations for Israeli and Palestinian attacks using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), which allows us to compare the point estimates of β^{IV} for Israeli and Palestinian attacks. We find that they are statistically different (we report p-values for the test of equality of these coefficients on the bottom row of Panel B of Table 5). The magnitude of the effect for Israeli attacks is large. A four-minute increase in the next-day news pressure due to predictable newsworthy events leads to an increase in the probability of an Israeli fatal attack on a given day of 24.5 percentage points (63%) and an increase in a death toll by a factor of 2.7. The point estimates are five to six times larger in the IV specification than in the corresponding OLS (reported in column 5 of Table A.5 in the online appendix), this is consistent with a severe measurement error bias in the OLS estimates. The magnitude of the effect in the reduced form is as follows: the probability of the Israeli attacks is 11 percentage points higher and the death toll 1.51 times higher during the days that coincide with the major

[21] The second-stage results are exactly the same if we use the dummy for major events rather than its first lead as an instrument for next-day news pressure. The first stage is slightly weaker, but still very strong not to worry about weak-instrument problem. The results of the first and the second stages are also similar if we use daily news pressure rather than its lead as the main explanatory variable. This is because both the news pressure and the dummy for major political and sports events are serially correlated.

political and sports events that we consider.[22]

To make sure that the difference between the OLS and IV estimates is driven by the predictability of events that push news pressure up, we conduct a placebo experiment, which uses the onset of U.S. disasters as a driver of news pressure. We estimate equation 2 instrumenting news pressure by the onset of natural and human-caused disasters in the United States. The results are presented in Panel C of Table 5. This panel has the exactly same structure as the other two panels of this table. In the first two columns we show that a U.S.-based disaster significantly raises both of our measures of news pressure. In columns 3, 4, 6 and 7, we show that news pressure driven by unpredictable disasters has no effect on the timing of Israeli attacks or their severity. In columns 5 and 8, we present the reduced form, where we also find no significant relationship. In the bottom row of Panel C, we present p-values from the test of equality of coefficients between the placebo test (reported in Panel C) and the baseline IV estimation for the Israeli attacks (reported in Panel A). Despite the fact that placebo effects tend to be less precisely estimated, we find significant differences for the occurrence of Israeli attacks in two specifications: the IV with the corrected news pressure and the reduced form.[23]

4.2.4. The types of Israeli attacks and news pressure

So far, we have presented evidence that the timing of Israeli attacks is significantly related to predictable newsworthy events and is unrelated to unpredictable events in the United States. We hypothesize that this relationship is a result of strategic behavior by Israeli authorities aimed at minimizing the impact of their operations on U.S. public opinion. This hypothesis has two important implications, which we test in this subsection. First, the attacks that are less costly to move in time should be more subject to strategic timing than attacks that

[22] In the online appendix, we show that the IV results are robust to controlling for dummies for Muslim and Jewish holidays (Table A.11) and for using news-pressure measure based on the three longest stories rather than first three stories (Table A.12).

[23] All tests for the equality of β^{IV} coefficients for the occurrence of attacks come from the estimation of the system of the equations exactly as they appear in the tables with GMM. In contrast, all tests for the equality of β^{IV} coefficients for the severity of attacks come from the GMM estimation of the system of log-linear equations with log (number of victims +1) as a dependent variable, rather than the ML negative binomial. To compare the reduced-form estimates for Israeli and Palestinian attacks, we use a system of seemingly unrelated regressions. To compare the estimates for the reduced-form estimates for the Israeli attacks between the baseline and the placebo, we estimate a single equation, in which the Israeli attacks (or the log of their victims) are regressed simultaneously on the dummies for the disaster onset and for the important predictable events.

are harder (more costly) to postpone. Second, attacks that are likely to generate high negative publicity should be more subject to strategic timing than attacks that are less likely to generate negative publicity.

The *B'Tselem* data contain information on the special targeted-killing operations by Israel Defense Forces, as declared by Israeli authorities. Targeted killing took place on 3.6% of days in our sample (this is a small subset of all Israeli attacks). These targeted killings are usually considered more urgent than other operations because their goal is to eliminate terrorist leaders and avert imminent terrorist attacks. These opportunities are rare and cannot be missed. In this case, the potential PR costs associated with possible collateral damage are outweighed by the security benefits. The data support this prediction.

The first column of Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of a multinomial logit regression with three potential mutually exclusive outcomes: a day with at least one Israeli attack classified as a targeted killing (column 1); a day with Israeli attacks not classified as a targeted killing (column 2); and a day with no Israeli attack (which is the comparison group). We relate the probability of each of these outcomes to the level of news pressure on the following day conditional on lags of news pressure, prior Palestinian attacks, and day-of-the-week, calendar-month and year fixed effects. In line with our hypothesis, we find that the timing of the targeted-killing operations is not significantly affected by next-day news pressure: the marginal effect on the probability of the targeted-killing outcome is positive, but small and statistically insignificant in contrast to the marginal effect for all other attacks, which, despite having military aims, were not acknowledged to have targeted specific Palestinian terrorists. The point estimates imply that a four-minute increase in news pressure tomorrow is associated with a 3.9 percentage-point increase in the probability of a nontargeted attack and a 0.2 percentage-point increase in the probability of a targeted killing. The difference in these effects is statistically significant. (The p-value of 0.037 for the test of equality of the marginal effects is reported at the bottom of the panel). Columns 2 and 3 present the results of ML negative binomial regressions, in which we consider the number of victims of the targeted killings and nontargeted attacks separately as outcomes. The results are consistent: we find a significant effect only for the victims of nontargeted killings.

As negative publicity for Israeli attacks presumably is associated mainly with the news coverage of the civilian victims, strategic timing should apply only to attacks that bear a risk of civilian casualties. Comprehensive data on whether the victims of each Israeli at-

tack were civilians, militants, or terrorists are not available. However, the UNOCHA dataset, which covers all Israeli attacks, including those that did not result in fatalities, and contains detailed information on the location of each attack and the weapon used. Using these data, coverring the period between 2005 and 2011, we construct three alternative (imperfect) proxies for the *ex ante* probability that each particular Israeli attack affected civilians: (1) whether this attack resulted in fatal casualties; (2) whether it involved the use of heavy weapons (such as missiles, rockets, sound bombs, explosives, tank shells, artillery, or shock grenades) or light weapons (such as live ammunition, rubber-coated metal bullets, or tear gas); and (3) whether the attack was carried out in areas of the Palestinian territories (governorates) with higher or lower population density. Presumably, attacks with heavy weapons result in a higher death toll, and attacks that target densely populated areas are more likely to affect civilians.[24]

To compare the effect of news pressure on the timing of the attacks that are more and that are less likely to result in civilian casualties, we estimate three multinomial logit regressions with three outcomes in each. The baseline outcome is always a day without an Israeli attack, and the other two outcomes are as follows: The first regression considers days with only nonfatal attacks vs. days when at least one attack is fatal; the second regression considers days only with attacks in areas with relatively low population density (below the median) vs. days with at least one attack in above-median population density area; and the third regression considers days with attacks using light ammunition vs. days with at least one attack using heavy weapons. We present the results in the first column (and remaining panels) of Table 6. We find that news pressure on a given day significantly affects the probability of attacks that result in fatal casualties, are executed in high-population-density areas and carried out with heavy weaponry. In contrast, news pressure does not significantly affect the probability of nondeadly attacks, attacks in areas with low population density, or attacks with light weapons. This is consistent with our prediction that only the attacks likely to result in civilian deaths are subject to strategic timing considerations. However, the test for equality of marginal effects between the two types of attacks rejects equality of coefficients at the 10% significance level only for attacks with light vs. heavy weapons (Panel D). The precision is not sufficient to reject the equality of coefficients in the other two cases; the p-values for these tests are 0.15 and 0.13. Figure 5 illustrates the effects of next-day news pressure on

[24] Attacks with heavy weapons and in densely populated areas are substantially more likely to result in fatalities: 68% and 49.6%, respectively, compared to 34.4% for an average attack.

the probability of an Israeli attack of each type. Similarly to Panel A, in columns 2 and 3 of Panels B, C, and D of Table 6 we report the results of ML negative binomial regressions for the number of casualties of Israeli attacks of each type. We find that the number of casualties of Israeli attacks that result in fatalities, that are executed in densely populated areas, and that involve the use of heavy weapons are significantly related to news pressure on the following day, in contrast, to the number injured and the casualties of attacks with light weapons and in areas with low population density. In regressions for population density, we look at all days in the sample, but restrict attention to Palestinian governorates with population density above and below the median. Note that for attacks that involve injuries and no fatalities, we restrict the sample to days without fatal attacks, and attacks with light weapons, we restrict the sample to days with no attacks with heavy weapons in order to have a reasonable comparison group.[25]

Overall, we find that targeted killings (which presumably are harder to move in time than nontargeted attacks) and attacks with light weapons (which presumably are less likely to result in civilian casualties than attacks with heavy weapons) are not timed to news pressure in contrast to nontargeted attacks and attacks with heavy weapons.

4.2.5. A COUNTERFACTUAL

Theoretically, the effect of news pressure on the number of attacks could be anywhere between two extreme scenarios. In the first scenario, news pressure affects only the timing, but not the number of attacks. In other words, each attack planned for a particular day but not carried out because of the expectation of low news pressure on the following day is just postponed to another day when news pressure is expected to be high. In the second scenario, there is a constant probability of an attack every day; whether an attack occurs on a given day depends on the costs and benefits attacking on that day. Thus, if the PR cost of an attack on a given day is too high because next-day news pressure is expected to be low, the attack is canceled and the cost-benefit calculation for the following day starts anew. Under this

[25] The results of the regressions for the number of injured and the number of victims of attacks with light weapons should be interpreted with caution because the sample selection in these regressions is done on the basis of the dependent variable (as the most severe attacks are dropped from the sample). Note also that all regressions in Table 6 do not include contemporaneous news pressure as a control. When news pressure at t is included in the list of covariates, the results are both quantitatively and qualitatively very similar, but the equality of the marginal effects of the news pressure at t+1 for different types of attacks is cannot rejected due to the loss of power. The p-value for targeted vs. nontargeted attacks is 0.110 and for light vs. heavy weapons – 0.137. The results are reported in Table A.13 in the online appendix.

scenario, the decision on whether to attack on a given day is a Markov process, and if the attack is not carried out on a given day, it gets canceled forever. We do not have enough statistical power to estimate the extent to which news pressure affects the number of Israeli attacks in addition to their timing. Most probability, the true state of the world is a combination of these two extreme scenarios.[26] Our estimates imply that irrespective of the scenario, the predicted probability of an attack on a given day is 2.7 times as large when the daily predictable news pressure is at its 90th percentile compared to its 10th percentile. In the first scenario ("the time displacement"), the number of predicted Israeli attacks per month is 12 and the number of predicted Palestinian victims per month is 25 regardless of the level of news pressure; these are the respective predicted values holding all covariates at means. In the second scenario ("the attack cancellation"), the number of attacks depends on the level of predictable news pressure: If news pressure is predicted to be at the 90th percentile of its distribution during the entire month, the predicted number of attacks that month will rise to 18 and the predicted number of victims will rise to 85. If, in contrast, news pressure is predicted to be at its 10th percentile, the predicted number of attacks is seven and the predicted number of victims is 20 per month.[27]

5. Mechanism: The coverage of conflict on the same day vs. next day

In this section, we explore the mechanism behind the effect. In particular, we shed light on why Israel times its attacks to the predicted news pressure on the following day rather than on the same day. The most obvious possible explanation is that it takes time for reporters to prepare a story. If news about important events in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict appeared in the media only one day after their occurrence, it would not have been surprising that Israel timed its attacks to predictable newsworthy events scheduled for the following day. We test and reject this hypothesis. Columns 1 to 3 of Table 7 report the results of a linear probability model in which we relate the conflict coverage to the Israeli attacks with controls for daily news pressure and seasonality with day-of-the-week and calendar-month fixed effects. In the first column, we restrict the sample to days with no Palestinian attack on either the same or the previous day and no Israeli attack on the previous day, and examine how the probabil-

[26] In the online appendix, we provide quotes from Nevo and Shur, eds (2003) that show that at least some attacks are moved in time. See, in particular, quotes [7] and [12].

[27] We present these numbers in Table A.14 in the online appendix; they are based on the estimates presented in Tables 5 and 2.

ity of conflict-related news is affected by an Israeli attack on the same day. In the second column, the sample consists of days with no Palestinian attack on the same or the previous day and no Israeli attack on the same day; here we examine how the probability of conflict-related news is affected by an Israeli attack on the previous day. The probability of news coverage significantly increases with Israeli attacks that occur both on the same day and on the previous day. In column 3, we compare the probability of coverage of Israeli attacks on the same day and on the previous day by regressing the dummy for any news on conflict on dummies for occurrence of Israeli attacks at t and $t-1$ on the full sample of days, conditional on the occurrence of Palestinian attacks at t and $t-1$, seasonality, and news pressure. We find that an Israeli attack is 31% more likely (14.5 vs. 11.1 percentage points) to be covered on the same day. This difference in statistically significant (with a p-value of 0.026 for the test of the equality of coefficients, as reported in the bottom row of the table.) The left panel of Figure 6 illustrates these findings. They indicate that the reason for why Israel times its attacks to high news pressure on the next day is unrelated to *when* the news stories on these attacks appear. Therefore, the reason must be related to differences in the nature of news coverage on the same day and on the next day—in particular, to the possibility that next-day news stories are less favorable for Israel's public image than same-day stories.

To test this mechanism, we first compare the length of news stories that appear on the same day and on the next day. The results are reported in Column 4 of Table 7. We find no significant difference in the length of news coverage of an attack that occurred on the same day vs. an attack that occurred one day before, despite that on average news on Israeli attacks is more likely to appear on the same day than on the next day. We regress the length of news about the conflict on the occurrence of Israeli attacks today and on the previous day controlling for the occurrence of Palestinian attacks using the ML negative binomial model. The coefficients on the occurrence of an Israeli attack at t and $t-1$ are similar in magnitude and the test for the equality of these coefficients yields a p-value of 0.74. This finding suggests that next-day news coverage of attacks is longer, conditional on the story being covered. We test this directly in column 5, where we restrict the sample to days with news on the conflict and estimate the same specification as in column 4 with the ML negative binomial truncated at zero (as the length of conflict-related stories in this subsample is always positive but still overdispersed). The coefficient on the occurrence of the same-day attack is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that the same-day coverage of Israeli

attacks has the same length, on average, as other news stories on conflict that are unrelated to Israeli attacks. In contrast, the coefficient on the occurrence of the previous-day attack is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the next-day coverage of the Israeli attack is longer than the average conflict-related story. (These differences are statistically significant: the p-value for the test for the equality of these coefficients is 0.033 as reported in the bottom row of the table). The right panel of Figure 6 illustrates this finding. These pieces of evidence suggest that an Israeli attack may get coverage on U.S. TV, both on the same day and on the next day, and that any next-day story includes a longer, more in-depth account of the events.

Second, we examine the differences between the content of conflict-related news reports on the same day and the content of conflict-related reports on the next day. As we discussed in the data section, the content of conflict-related videos was coded for two networks: CNN and NBC. Out of all 755 newscasts devoted to the conflict on these networks during our observation period, 384 focused on a particular Israeli attack against Palestinians, of which 243 did not mention any Palestinian attack. Of these 243 newscasts focusing on particular Israeli attacks and no Palestinian attacks, 192 were aired on the day of the attack, 34 were aired on the following day, six covered specific attacks that took place both on the same and on the following day and only 11 covered attacks that occurred on other days. A total of 177 videos were fully devoted to Palestinian attacks against Israelis, speaking about specific attacks or a threat of attacks, in general. Further, 170 conflict-related videos did not cover attacks at all but focused on other related issues, such as peace negotiations. Overall, 428 videos were devoted to a specific attack on either side of the conflict that occurred on the same day or on the previous day.

In Table 8, we report the main results of the comparison between the content of the same-day and the next-day coverage of the attacks. In Panel A, we focus on the most restrictive sample of videos, i.e., those that were devoted to a particular Israeli attack, did not mention any Palestinian attacks, and were aired on the day of the attack or on the following day. There are 232 such videos, 40 of which were aired one day after the attack. We regress the variables measuring different aspects of the video content on a dummy for whether the story appeared on the day after the attack, conditional on network and coder fixed effects.[28] In Panel B, looking at the entire population of videos, we regress each characteristic of the

[28] The results are virtually unchanged if we exclude from the sample six videos that covered attacks which lasted two days and started one day before.

content on a dummy for next-day coverage, controlling for the following set of covariates: a dummy for whether videos were aired neither on the same day nor on the next day (leaving same-day videos as the comparison group), a dummy for whether the video covered a Palestinian attack and the interaction of this variable with the dummy for the next-day coverage, a dummy for whether the story was devoted to a particular attack (rather than, for example, a series of different attacks), and network and coder fixed effects. In both panels, we adjust standard errors to clusters in error terms at month$\times$year level.

The results of both specifications draw a consistent picture. Regard the factual content, the only difference between same-day and next-day coverage of Israeli attacks is that the next-day newscasts are 28 percentage points more likely to report information on the exact location of the attack (72% vs. 44% of the newscasts).[29] Other dry facts about the attack, such as the number of victims (total or just civilian), or the weapon used, are as likely to be reported on the same day as on the next day. In contrast, next-day newscasts are significantly more likely to report personal information about the civilian victims, such as their names and family stories. This difference is substantial: 37.9% of the next-day stories include personal information about civilian victims against only 12% of the same-day news stories. Burials and scenes of mourning are also significantly more likely to appear on the next-day newscast. This highly emotional content appears in 30.4% of the next-day newscasts compared to 11.6% of the same-day newscasts. Similarly, interviews with family members and friends of the victims and witnesses appear in 16% of the next-day newscasts compared to only 9.6% of the same-day newscasts.[30] These results are illustrated in Figure 7.[31]

In the last three columns of Table 8, we take averages of responses to three groups of questions on different aspects of the news coverage of the attacks: (1) the presence of the information on severity of the attack (the weapon used and the number of total and civilian victims), (2) the presence of images of victims (fotos and video footage of victims, burials, and the aftermath of the attack), and (3) the presence of personal details of the victims and of interviews with relatives, friends, and witnesses. When we combine these responses, we also find significant differences between the same-day and next-day coverage of the attacks only

[29] We report the magnitudes based on estimates reported in Panel A.

[30] We combine two questions—one about interviews with witnesses, and one about interviews with friends and relatives—in one variable to maximize the variation, because only when these questions are combined, do they result in sufficient number of videos containing interviews.

[31] Table A.15 in the online appendix reports analogous results to those reported in Table 8 for all the remaining questions in the questionnaire. There are no other significant differences between same-day and next-day coverage, if we consider answers to individual questions without combining them.

for the images of victims and personal information of the victims, but not for information on the severity of the attacks. The difference between the coefficients on the next-day coverage dummy in the regressions for information on the severity of the attacks and for the personal stories about the victims is statistically significant (with a p-value of 0.067). This difference is not significant between regressions for information on the severity of the attacks and for all questions about the images of victims combined, but it is significant between regressions for information on the severity of the attacks and for footage of burials or mourning taken individually (with a p-value of 0.014).

These results provide a clear rationale for why Israel should be more concerned about next-day news coverage of its attacks on U.S. media: next-day coverage is more damaging for Israel's image abroad because it is more emotionally charged than same-day coverage. This is due to the fact that the next-day newscasts feature personal stories about civilian victims, rather than simply reporting dry facts, and rely more heavily on visuals rather than just a narrative. As is well known in cognitive and social psychology (e.g., Borgida and Nisbett, 1977; Martin and Powers, 1982; Wilkins, 1983), personal stories are more powerful at conveying information than dry numbers, as they help listeners, readers, and viewers relate to the story. Also, imagery conveys information more effectively than words (e.g., Mandl and Levin, eds, 1989; Houghton and Willows, eds, 1987a,b; Houts et al., 2006), as stories appear more real when told with images that evoke strong emotions: funerals, mourning, suffering. Overall, these findings strongly support the hypothesis that Israeli authorities—to mitigate damage from emotionally charged news coverage of civilian Palestinian victims—time their most severe attacks to coincide with U.S. news pressure.

From the estimation based on the full sample (Panels B of both Tables 8 and A.15), we also conclude that: (1) stories that appear on days other than the same day or the next day are much less likely to present any information or visuals regarding attacks on either side, which suggests that these stories do not focus on attacks; (2) same-day stories about Palestinian attacks are significantly more likely (than same-day stories about Israeli attacks) to contain basic information about the attack, personal information about victims, interviews with witnesses, footage of victims, and reaction from Israeli and Palestinian authorities, as can be seen from the estimated coefficient on the dummy for the story about Palestinian attack; (3) little difference exists between the content of same-day and next-day videos devoted to Palestinian attacks, as can be seen from the estimated coefficients on the interaction

between the next-day coverage and the dummy for stories about Palestinian attacks (with few exceptions).

Why do such marked differences exist between the content of same-day and next-day coverage of Israeli attacks, whereas the same pattern does not hold for coverage of Palestinian attacks? The differences in coverage of Israeli attacks between same day and next day are most likely driven by general technological constraints on reporting armed conflicts and by local traditions, specific to the Middle East. As for the technology of news production, there are usually no international reporters in the vicinity of an Israeli attack because the Israeli military does not leak its intentions to journalists, and though distances in Israel and the Palestinian territories are very small, it still takes time to get to an attack site.[32] Furthermore, even when reporters can quickly reach the site of the attack, being there is dangerous for reporters and (potential) witnesses due to the risk of follow-up strikes.[33] Thus, on the day of an attack, it is hard for reporters to gather footage and collect personal details about the victims. Conditions are more favorable for journalists on the day after an attack. Local traditions call for burying of victims one day after death.[34] The burial ceremony takes place in open air and is attended by the local population in large numbers. This is a safe opportunity for reporters to collect personal information about the victims.[35] These funerals are also prime opportunities to capture emotionally charged visuals of mourning and corpses. Some Israeli commentators, including Prime Minister Nethanyau, have suggested that Palestinians use burial ceremonies to portray Israelis as violent aggressors and themselves as innocent victims.[36] The reason why news coverage of Palestinian attacks on Israel is more similar between the same day and the next day may relate to Israel's strategic behavior. The IDF

[32] This is especially important if an attack occurs in Gaza. The Erez checkpoint is the only way in and out of Gaza; and, despite the fact that it is only 1 hour and 40 minutes away from Jerusalem, a journalist can pass only at precise hours and not on Shabbat. A journalist also requires an accreditation from Hamas, which can be arranged through a so-called local "fixer," a professional intermediary; and it often takes time to arrange for a fixer's help. It is much easier for a foreign journalist to get to the West Bank (Ramallah is just 10 kilometres north of Jerusalem). However, even when attack occurs in the West Bank, it may take hours to get to the site of the attack because of certain key checkpoints (such as Qalandyia) may be closed by the IDF restricting access to certain Arab villages during violence. The source is the authors' interview of Piort Smolar, the special correspondent for *Le Monde* in Jerusalem.

[33] See, for instance, the CNN interview with *New York Times* photojournalist Tyler Hicks about the attack on July 16, 2014, which aired the same day; it is available on the Vanderbilt Television News Archive.

[34] As is the case for most ethnic groups with ancestry originating from places with hot climate.

[35] The fact that there are many people on the street is the best insurance against a possible Israeli attack; and relatives and friends of the victims are present.

[36] Our sample period ends before the Twitter revolution; therefore, we cannot analyze how social media, particularly Twitter, affected the strategic timing effects that we uncover.

creates favorable conditions for international reporters by giving them prompt access to the site of Palestinian attacks right after they occur, allowing them to film the site, interview witnesses, and produce videos of the damage and the victims. As discussed in Nevo and Shur, eds (2003), this policy is motivated by Israel's understanding of the effects of international news coverage on public opinion.

Finally, we examine whether there is a difference in how news about the attacks is associated with the volume of Google searches about the conflict depending on whether the news appears on the same day as the attack or on the following day. If, as we argue above, next-day broadcasts are more emotional, one might expect that people pay more attention to the conflict after next-day broadcasts. The data are consistent with this hypothesis. We split daily news on conflict into three categories: conflict news that appears on the same day as an Israeli attack, conflict news that appears one day after an Israeli attack, and all other news on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. During the sample period with available Google data, there are 140, 134, and 59 days with such broadcasts, respectively. In columns 1 and 3 of Table 9, we regress the log volume of Google searches on the incidence and the length of conflict news separately for each of these types of news stories, controlling for the occurrence and severity of the attacks on both sides of the conflict at t and $t-1$. We find that the volume of Google searches on the conflict is significantly associated with conflict-related news items and their length when these news cover an Israeli attack one day before and are unrelated to the news on conflict when these news cover an Israeli attack that occurred on the same day. The difference between the effects of the same-day news and the next-day news is statistically significant irrespective of specification. (p-values are reported at the bottom of the table.)[37] As Google searches are associated with conflict news both on the same day and on the day before, we add (in columns 2 and 4) the incidence and the length of conflict news one day before, separately for each type of conflict news. In these regressions, we add controls for the occurrence and severity of conflict at t-2. As above, we find that Google searches are significantly positively associated with the previous day's news on attacks that occurred one day before, but not with the previous day's news that cover attacks that occurred on the same day. The difference in the magnitude of the coefficients on the same-day vs. the

[37] Figure A.6 in the online appendix summarises the data: it shows the average log daily volume of Google searches on the days when news about Israeli attacks appear separately for days with news about the Israeli attacks that occurred on the same day and that occurred a day before and there were no Palestinian attacks either today or yesterday.

next-day broadcasts at t-1 is significant for the length of broadcast.

As we discussed above in relation to Table 2, the association between Google searches on conflict and news on conflict may be driven by the unobserved characteristics of attacks. This endogeneity problem also applies, to a lesser extent, to this analysis: Had the unobserved characteristics driven the association between Google searches today and news today about an attack yesterday, we would have expected also to find a positive association between Google searches today and news yesterday about an attack that occurred yesterday. Instead, we find a positive association with the news yesterday about an attack that occurred two days ago. These results are consistent with our hypothesis. However, they should be interpreted as an association rather than a causal relationship, as we do not have an exogenous source of variation on whether news media cover the conflict events on the same day or on the following day.

Overall, we find strong empirical support for the hypothesis that Israel times its attacks strategically to avoid conflict coverage on the day following Israeli attacks in order to avoid more emotional, more negative news coverage.

6. Conclusions

We present systematic evidence that policy makers behave strategically in timing unpopular actions to coincide with other newsworthy events that distract the public's attention so as to minimize negative publicity. We focus on the relationship between the timing of attacks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the presence of important events on U.S. TV news.

Israeli authorities time their attacks to minimize their coverage in next-day newscasts, which are more likely than same-day newscasts to feature personal stories of civilian victims and emotionally charged videos of burials and mourning. This strategy is aimed at reducing the negative impact of Israeli attacks on the perception of Israel's image by the U.S. public opinion. It is developed with full understanding of both the technological aspects of news reporting in conflict zones and the cognitive psychology of the effect of media on public opinion.

Israeli officials apply this strategic timing only to predictable newsworthy events and only to military actions that are likely to generate negative publicity (i.e., attacks with heavy weapons, for which the risk of having civilians affected is particularly high). We also show that strategic timing is not applied to targeted killings, which are extremely urgent. There is

no effect of U.S. news on Palestinian terrorist attacks; this could be explained by the lack of coordination among different Palestinian factions that perpetrate violence against Israel or by lower responsiveness of Palestinians to U.S. public opinion.

Our results suggest that policy makers' strategic behavior may undermine the effectiveness of mass media as a watchdog, thus reducing citizens' ability to keep public officials accountable.

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FIGURE 1: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN FATALITIES BY MONTH WITH AND WITHOUT THE GAZA WAR, 2000–2011

PANEL A: ENTIRE SAMPLE PERIOD



PANEL B: EXCLUDING THE GAZA WAR (DECEMBER 27, 2008 - JANUARY 18, 2009)



Note: The figure illustrates the intensity of conflict over the observation period. It reports the monthly number of fatalities caused by Israeli and Palestinian attacks. The shaded areas indicate the periods of the Gaza War (Operation Cast Lead) (on both graphs) and of Operation Defensive Shield (on the lower graph). The vertical line marks the end of the Second Intifada. The horizontal lines indicate the average monthly number of fatalities separately for the Second Intifada and post-Intifada periods.

FIGURE 2: COVERAGE OF CONFLICT IN U.S. NEWS

PANEL A: NEWS ABOUT CONFLICT AND ATTACKS



PANEL B: NEWS ABOUT ATTACKS AND NEWS PRESSURE



Note: The figure illustrates that the conflict events are covered by the U.S. TV news and that they are covered less with an increase in (corrected) news pressure.

FIGURE 3: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN ATTACKS AND U.S. NEWS PRESSURE



Note: The figure presents the relationship between the attacks and news pressure. It reports the estimated coefficients (and respective 95% confidence intervals for Newey-West standard errors) from the regressions of occurrence of Israeli and Palestinian attacks on news pressure between three days before and five days after the event from the estimation of equation 1 with the full set of seven lags and leads of news pressure as covariates. The two upper plots use the baseline (corrected) news-pressure measure, and the two lower plots use the uncorrected news pressure. The list of covariates also includes year, calendar-month, and day-of-the-week fixed effects, and controls for the occurrence of the attacks on the other side of the conflict one day, one week, and two weeks before. The Gaza War is excluded from the sample.

FIGURE 4: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN ATTACKS AND OTHER PREDICTABLE AND EXOGENOUS NEWSWORTHY EVENTS IN THE U.S.

PANEL A: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND NEWSWORTHY EVENTS



PANEL B: PALESTINIAN ATTACKS AND NEWSWORTHY EVENTS



Note: The figure illustrates how the frequency of attacks depends on the timing of major political and sports events. It presents the share of days with attacks on each side of the conflict during important U.S. political and sports events (with one day forward) and during all other days, with their corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The figures are very similar if we do not take the lead of the major events, but instead use a contemporaneous measure.

FIGURE 5: TYPES OF ATTACKS AND NEWS PRESSURE



Note: The figure illustrates the relationship between news pressure and different types of Israeli attacks. It presents the estimated marginal effects (along with their 95% confidence intervals) of a change in news pressure on the probability of an Israeli attack of a certain type. The estimates come from the multinomial logit specification presented in column 1 of Table 6. The regressions include controls for seasonality, prior Palestinian attacks, and lags of news pressure.

FIGURE 6: EFFECT OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON THE SAME DAY AND ON THE PREVIOUS DAY ON THE FREQUENCY AND LENGTH OF CONFLICT-RELATED NEWS



Note: The figure illustrates how the probability and the length of coverage of attacks depends on whether the story is aired on the same day or on the following day after the attack. The figure presents the estimated coefficients on the occurrence of the Israeli attack at t and t-1 (along with their 95% confidence intervals) in the regressions which relate the incidence of conflict news and the length of conflict news provided that the conflict is covered on the Israeli attacks on the same day and on the previous day, controlling for seasonality, incidence of Palestinian attacks and news pressure. We report these specifications in columns 3 and 5 of Table 7.

FIGURE 7: CONTENT OF NEWS COVERAGE OF ISRAELI ATTACKS ON THE SAME DAY AND ON THE NEXT DAY



Note: The figure illustrates the differences in content of same-day and next-day coverage of Israeli attacks. It presents the frequencies (along with their 95% confidence intervals) of the following aspects of news coverage of Israeli attacks on U.S. news separately for news stories that aired on the same day as the attack and on the day after the attack: information on the number of civilian victims, personal information about the victims, footage of burials or mourning, and interviews with friends, relatives or witnesses.

TABLE 1: NEWS PRESSURE AND THE LENGTH OF CONFLICT-RELATED NEWS

PANEL A: FULL SAMPLE

Dependent variable:	(1) Length of conflict news	(2) Corrected news pressure	(3)	(4) Uncorrected News pressure	(5)
Model:	OLS (1st stage)	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
Intifada, Defensive Shield and Cast Lead	5.046*** (1.330)				
Length of conflict news (minutes)		-0.004 (0.003)	0.0013 (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.003)	-0.017*** (0.005)
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,003	4,003	4,003	4,003	4,003
R-squared	0.288	0.099	0.097	0.144	0.143
F-stat, excl. instr.	14.40	—	14.40	—	14.40

PANEL B: SAMPLE OF DAYS WITH AN ATTACK ON THE SAME DAY OR THE PREVIOUS DAY

Dependent variable:	Length of conflict news	Corrected news pressure		Uncorrected News pressure	
Model:	OLS (1st stage)	OLS	2SLS	OLS	2SLS
Intifada, Defensive Shield and Cast Lead	5.291*** (1.235)				
Length of conflict news (minutes)		-0.005* (0.003)	-0.00023 (0.006)	-0.021*** (0.003)	-0.018*** (0.005)
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,331	2,331	2,331	2,331	2,331
R-squared	0.295	0.137	0.134	0.199	0.198
F-stat, excl. instr.	18.35	—	18.35	—	18.35

Note: The table examines the relationship between news pressure and news about conflict. Column 1 presents the first stage, showing that the length of conflict-related news is higher in periods of intense fighting. Columns 2 and 4 present OLS regressions, and columns 3 and 5 present the second stages of the 2SLS regressions with the two measures of news pressure as dependent variables and length of conflict news as the main explanatory variable. Panel A uses full sample; Panel B uses sample of days with an attack on the same or on the previous day. All regressions include year, calendar-month, and day-of-the-week fixed effects. Standard errors adjusted for clusters by month×year are reported in parentheses. *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

TABLE 2: COVERAGE OF CONFLICT, NEWS PRESSURE, AND GOOGLE SEARCHES

Dependent variable:	(1) Any news on conflict	(2) Length of conflict news	(3) Any news on conflict	(4) Length of conflict news	(5) Log daily volume of Google searches for "Isr.-Pal. conflict"	(6) Log daily volume of Google searches for "Isr.-Pal. conflict"
Model:	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.	OLS	OLS
Sample:	All days	All days	Attack at t or t-1	Attack at t or t-1	All days	All days
Sample period:	2000-2011	2000-2011	2000-2011	2000-2011	2004-2011	2004-2011
Israeli attack (t or t-1)	0.100*** (0.020)	0.969*** (0.183)				
Palestinian attack (t or t-1)	0.112*** (0.032)	0.680*** (0.140)				
News pressure (t)			-0.079* (0.042)	-0.712*** (0.267)		
Ln(victims Isr. attacks+1) (t or t-1)			0.169*** (0.016)	0.802*** (0.089)	0.130*** (0.043)	0.053* (0.0277)
Ln(victims Pal. attacks+1) (t or t-1)			0.134*** (0.024)	0.572*** (0.099)	0.042 (0.062)	0.005 (0.057)
Length of conflict news (t or t-1)						0.137*** (0.016)
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Linear time trend	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,005	4,005	2,331	2,331	2,741	2,741
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.228	0.101	0.292	0.121	0.330	0.376

Note: The table provides suggestive evidence on the premises upon which the main hypothesis rests. In columns 1 and 2, we regress measures of news coverage of conflict-related stories on U.S. media on dummies for the occurrence of Israeli and Palestinian attacks in the same or previous day. In columns 3 and 4, we restrict the sample to day, such that an Israeli or a Palestinian attack occurred on the same day or on the previous day, and regress the measures of conflict-related news coverage on the same-day news pressure, controlling for the intensity of the attacks, measured by the log of the number of victims (+1). In columns 5 and 6, the log of volume of Google searches for "the Israeli-Palestinian conflict" is regressed on the severity of attacks and the length of conflict news. All regressions include year, calendar-month, and day-of-the-week fixed effects. Regressions for Google searches also control for the linear trend within each year. R-squared is reported in columns 1 and 4, pseudo R-squared in all others. Standard errors clustered by month×year are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 3: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND NEWS PRESSURE

PANEL A: NEWS PRESSURE

Dependent variable:	(1) Occurrence	(2) Occurrence	(3) Occurrence	(4) Ln(1+victims)	(5) Ln(1+victims)	(6) Ln(1+victims)	(7) Num. victims
Model:	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.
News pressure t	0.073**	0.030	0.026	0.128**	0.057	0.027	0.032
	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.143)
News pressure t+1		0.084**	0.077**		0.137***	0.120**	0.479***
		(0.034)	(0.035)		(0.047)	(0.049)	(0.159)
News pressure t-1			-0.027			-0.035	-0.208
			(0.035)			(0.046)	(0.157)
Palestinian attacks			0.104***			0.220***	0.434***
(previous day)			(0.030)			(0.057)	(0.101)
Palestinian attacks			0.086***			0.168***	0.403***
(previous week)			(0.021)			(0.036)	(0.089)
Palestinian attacks			0.098***			0.142***	0.301***
(week before previous)			(0.022)			(0.036)	(0.086)
7 lags of P	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,048	4,045	4,024	4,048	4,045	4,024	4,024
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.181	0.183	0.196	0.175	0.177	0.195	0.069

PANEL B: UNCORRECTED NEWS PRESSURE

Dependent variable:	(1) Occurrence	(2) Occurrence	(3) Occurrence	(4) Ln(1+victims)	(5) Ln(1+victims)	(6) Ln(1+victims)	(7) Num. victims
Model:	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.
Uncorrected	0.026	-0.011	-0.006	0.021	-0.024	-0.038	-0.204
News pressure t	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.154)
Uncorrected		0.067*	0.067*		0.083*	0.078	0.345**
News pressure t+1		(0.035)	(0.036)		(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.164)
Uncorrected			-0.032			-0.031	-0.144
News pressure t-1			(0.035)			(0.046)	(0.154)
Palestinian attacks			0.105***			0.221***	0.424***
(previous day)			(0.030)			(0.057)	(0.100)
Palestinian attacks			0.086***			0.169***	0.408***
(previous week)			(0.022)			(0.036)	(0.091)
Palestinian attacks			0.099***			0.144***	0.307***
(week before previous)			(0.022)			(0.036)	(0.087)
7 lags of uncorrected P	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,048	4,045	4,024	4,048	4,045	4,024	4,024
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.180	0.181	0.194	0.173	0.174	0.192	0.068

Note: The table examines the relationship between the timing and intensity of Israeli attacks and news pressure. The dependent variable is: the occurrence of Israeli attacks (columns 1-3), the log of the number of fatalities of Israeli attacks (columns 4-6), the number of fatalities of Israeli attacks (column 7). OLS regressions presented in columns 1-6; maximum likelihood negative binomial regression in column 7. All regressions include year, calendar-month, and day-of-the-week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by month×year are reported in parentheses in columns (1) and (4); Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses in all other columns. Panel A uses baseline news-pressure measure; Panel B - uncorrected news pressure. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 4: PALESTINIAN ATTACKS AND NEWS PRESSURE

PANEL A: NEWS PRESSURE

Dependent variable:	(1) Occurrence	(2) Occurrence	(3) Occurrence	(4) Ln(1+victims)	(5) Ln(1+victims)	(6) Ln(1+victims)	(7) Num. victims
Model:	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.
News pressure t	-0.008	-0.015	-0.004	-0.014	-0.022	-0.016	-0.193
	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.464)
News pressure t+1		0.012	0.019		0.015	0.020	0.133
		(0.018)	(0.018)		(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.345)
News pressure t-1			-0.023			-0.027	-0.564
			(0.021)			(0.024)	(0.470)
Israeli attacks			0.013			0.021**	0.281*
(previous day)			(0.009)			(0.010)	(0.165)
Israeli attacks			0.013**			0.012**	0.706*
(previous week)			(0.006)			(0.006)	(0.391)
Israeli attacks			0.006			0.003	0.310
(week before previous)			(0.006)			(0.006)	(0.405)
7 lags of P	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,048	4,045	4,024	4,048	4,045	4,024	4,024
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.088	0.088	0.089	0.085	0.085	0.088	0.108
p-value: $\beta_0^{Isr} = \beta_0^{Pal}$	—	0.046**	0.097*	—	0.013**	0.024**	—

PANEL B: UNCORRECTED NEWS PRESSURE

Dependent variable:	(1) Occurrence	(2) Occurrence	(3) Occurrence	(4) Ln(1+victims)	(5) Ln(1+victims)	(6) Ln(1+victims)	(7) Num. victims
Model:	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.
Uncorrected	-0.030*	-0.035**	-0.026	-0.048**	-0.052***	-0.052**	-0.764
News pressure t	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.489)
Uncorrected		0.009	0.011		0.007	0.006	-0.102
News pressure t+1		(0.018)	(0.018)		(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.368)
Uncorrected			-0.018			-0.014	-0.370
News pressure t-1			(0.021)			(0.024)	(0.471)
Israeli attacks		0.015	0.013		0.024**	0.022**	0.273*
(previous day)		(0.009)	(0.009)		(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.164)
Israeli attacks		0.013**	0.012**		0.011**	0.011**	0.676*
(previous week)		(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.396)
Israeli attacks		0.004	0.005		0.001	0.003	0.273
(week before previous)		(0.007)	(0.006)		(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.407)
7 lags of uncorrected P	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,048	4,044	4,024	4,048	4,044	4,024	4,024
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.088	0.088	0.089	0.086	0.086	0.088	0.109

Note: The table examines the relationship between the timing and intensity of Palestinian attacks and news pressure. The dependent variable is: the occurrence of Israeli attacks (columns 1-3), the log of the number of fatalities of Israeli attacks (columns 4-6), the number of fatalities of Israeli attacks (column 7). OLS regressions presented in columns 1-6; maximum likelihood negative binomial regression in column 7. All regressions include year, calendar-month, and day-of-the-week fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by month×year are reported in parentheses in columns (1) and (4); Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses in all other columns. Panel A uses baseline news-pressure measure; Panel B uses uncorrected news pressure. The last row of Panel A presents the p-values of the test for equality between the effects of news pressure for Israeli and Palestinian attacks. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 5: ATTACKS AND NEXT-DAY NEWS PRESSURE DRIVEN BY PREDICTABLE POLITICAL AND SPORTS EVENTS

PANEL A: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND PREDICTABLE NEWSWORTHY EVENTS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent variable:	P t+1	Uncorrected P t+1	Occurrence	Occurrence	Occurrence	Num. Victims	Num. Victims	Num. Victims
Model:	OLS 1st stage	OLS 1st stage	OLS IV 2nd stage	OLS IV 2nd stage	OLS Reduced form	ML Neg. Bin. IV 2nd stage	ML Neg. Bin. IV 2nd stage	ML Neg. Bin. Reduced form
Political/Sports events t+1	0.178***	0.190***			0.109***			0.413**
	(0.035)	(0.034)			(0.041)			(0.171)
News pressure t+1			0.613**			2.485***		
			(0.242)			(0.873)		
Uncorrected News pressure t+1				0.573***			2.322***	
				(0.218)			(0.790)	
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,047	4,047	4,047	4,047	4,050	4,047	4,047	4,050
R-squared	0.117	0.133	0.128	0.127	0.195	—	—	0.068
F-stat, excl. instr.	25.32	31.71	25.32	31.71	—	25.32	31.71	—

PANEL B: PALESTINIAN ATTACKS AND PREDICTABLE NEWSWORTHY EVENTS

Dependent variable:	P t+1	Uncorrected P t+1	Occurrence	Occurrence	Occurrence	Num. Victims	Num. Victims	Num. Victims
Model:	OLS 1st stage	OLS 1st stage	OLS IV 2nd stage	OLS IV 2nd stage	OLS Reduced form	ML Neg. Bin. IV 2nd stage	ML Neg. Bin. IV 2nd stage	ML Neg. Bin. Reduced form
Political/Sports events t+1	0.140***	0.152***			-0.018			-0.017
	(0.040)	(0.040)			(0.014)			(0.331)
News pressure t+1			-0.132			0.796		
			(0.101)			(2.214)		
Uncorrected News pressure t+1				-0.121			0.732	
				(0.089)			(2.032)	
FEs (year, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prior Israeli attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,046	4,046	4,046	4,046	4,049	4,046	4,046	4,049
R-squared	0.096	0.108	0.064	0.070	0.085	—	—	0.097
F excl. instr.	12.04	14.74	12.04	14.74	—	12.04	14.74	—
p-value: $\beta_0^{IsrIV} = \beta_0^{PalIV}$			0.003***	0.003***	0.016**	0.022**	0.020**	0.079*

PANEL C: PLACEBO: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND UNPREDICTABLE NEWSWORTHY EVENTS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Dependent variable:	P t+1	Uncorrected P t+1	Occurrence	Occurrence	Occurrence	Num. Victims	Num. Victims	Num. Victims
Model:	OLS 1st stage	OLS 1st stage	OLS IV 2nd stage	OLS IV 2nd stage	OLS Reduced form	ML Neg. Bin. IV 2nd stage	ML Neg. Bin. IV 2nd stage	ML Neg. Bin. Reduced form
Disaster onset t+1	0.0818***	0.0785***			-0.0237			-0.1310
	(0.025)	(0.026)			(0.045)			(0.162)
News pressure t+1			-0.279			-1.083		
			(0.568)			(2.052)		
Uncorrected News pressure t+1				-0.291			-1.129	
				(0.587)			(2.143)	
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,046	4,046	4,046	4,046	4,049	4,046	4,046	4,049
R-squared	0.105	0.118	0.161	0.163	0.193	—	—	0.068
F-stat, excl. instr.	10.65	9.152	10.65	9.152	—	10.65	9.152	—
p-value: $\beta_0^{IsrIV:pred} = \beta_0^{IsrIV:unpred}$			0.098*	0.112	0.072*	0.112	0.129	0.221

Note: The table presents IV regressions with the dummy for major sports and political events used as an instrument for news pressure in Panels A and B and the dummy for onset of a U.S.-based disaster in Panel C. Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters by month×year in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 6: THE URGENCY OF ATTACKS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
(IN COLUMN 1: MARGINAL EFFECTS REPORTED)

Model:	(1) Multinomial Logit, daily outcome relative to days with no attack: (a)	(b)	(2) ML Neg.Bin.	(3) ML Neg.Bin.
PANEL A: TARGETED VS. NONTARGETED ATTACKS, SAMPLE: 2001–2011				
Dependent variable:	Days with targeted attacks	Days with nontargeted attacks	Victims of targ. killings	Victims of nontarg. attacks
News pressure t+1	0.006	0.097**	0.189	0.519***
	(0.010)	(0.042)	(0.408)	(0.160)
Share of days	3.6	35.3		
Observations	4,025		4,025	4,025
p-value for (a) = (b)	0.037**			
PANEL B: FATAL VS. NONFATAL ATTACKS, SAMPLE: 2005–2011				
Dependent variable:	Days with nonfatal attacks	Days with fatal attacks	Injuries	Fatalities
News pressure t+1	-0.046	0.082*	-0.047	0.710***
	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.177)	(0.245)
Share of days	48.6	27.0		
Observations	2,485		1,825	2,485
p-value for (a) = (b)	0.149			
PANEL C: ATTACKS IN LESS VS. MORE DENSELY POPULATED AREAS (LDP VS. MDP), SAMPLE: 2005–2011				
Dependent variable:	Days with attacks, LDP areas	Days with attacks, MDP areas	Victims, LDP areas	Victims, MDP areas
News pressure t+1	-0.053	0.086*	-0.004	0.603**
	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.153)	(0.243)
Share of days	30.3	45.4		
Observations	2,483		2,483	2,483
p-value for (a) = (b)	0.126			
PANEL D: ATTACKS WITH LIGHT WEAPONS (LW) VS. HEAVY WEAPONS (HW), SAMPLE: 2005–2011				
Dependent variable:	Days with attacks using LW only	Days with attacks using HW	Victims w. light W	Victims w. heavy W
News pressure t+1	-0.038	0.079**	-0.137	0.787**
	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.168)	(0.357)
Share of days	55.2	20.1		
Observations	2,449		1,962	2,449
p-value for (a) = (b)	0.095*			
News pressure (lags)	Yes		Yes	Yes
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes		Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes		Yes	Yes

Note: The table explores how strategic timing depends on the costs of moving the attacks in time and the ex ante probability of civilian casualties. Column 1 reports results of multinomial logit regressions with three outcomes, with days without attacks the baseline (comparison) outcome. Marginal effects on the probability are reported. Columns 2 and 3 report results of ML negative binomial regressions. Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters by month×year in parentheses in column 1 and Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses in columns 2 and 3. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 7: SAME-DAY VS. NEXT-DAY NEWS COVERAGE OF CONFLICT EVENTS

Dependent variable:	(1) Presence of conflict news	(2) Presence of conflict news	(3) Presence of conflict news	(4) Length of conflict news	(5) Length of conflict news
Model:	OLS	OLS	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin. zero-truncated
Sample:	Days with no Palestinian attack at t-1 or t and no *other* Israeli attack at t-1 or t		All days	All days	Days with conflict news
Israeli attack at t	0.113***		0.145***	0.940***	-0.140
	(0.020)		(0.017)	(0.107)	(0.131)
Israeli attack at t-1		0.093***	0.111***	0.981***	0.403**
		(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.132)	(0.196)
Palestinian attack at t			0.249***	1.268***	0.647***
			(0.031)	(0.152)	(0.181)
Palestinian attack at t-1			0.185***	1.014***	0.626***
			(0.035)	(0.159)	(0.190)
News pressure at t	-0.034	-0.024	-0.051	-0.575**	-1.033***
	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.277)	(0.384)
FEs (DOW, month)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,245	2,263	3,979	3,979	705
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.046	0.040	0.153	0.066	0.040
p-value: Isr.vic: t= t-1	—	—	0.026	0.740	0.033

Note: The table examines the relationship between occurrence of Israeli attacks and conflict-related coverage on the same day and the following day. Columns 1 to 3 report OLS regressions with the dummy for conflict-related news as dependent variable. In columns 4 and 5, length of conflict news is the dependent variable. In column 1, we focus on days for which no Palestinian attacks occurred on the same day or the previous day and no Israeli attack on the previous day. In column 2, the sample is the days with no Palestinian attacks on the same day or previous day and no Israeli attack on the same day. Columns 3 and 4 use the full sample. In column 5, the sample consists of days in which conflict-related stories appeared on the news. ML negative binomial regressions are reported in columns 4 and 5. In column 5, it is zero-truncated. Standard errors clustered by month×year are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE 8: CONTENT OF NEWS STORIES THAT APPEAR ON THE SAME DAY AND ON THE NEXT DAY

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Content:	Info on exact location q12	Info on number victims q14	Personal info on victims q19	Video of burials or mourning q20	Interview of friends/ relatives or witnesses q21 or q22	Info on attack severity (q11+q13+ q14)/3	Images of victims (q16+q17+ q18+q20)/6	Personal stories (q19+q21+ q22)/3
Panel A: Sample of news stories about an Israeli attack, occurred on the same day or previous day not mentioning Palestinian attacks								
Next-day coverage	0.280***	0.028	0.258***	0.188**	0.064*	0.010	0.061*	0.115***
	(0.063)	(0.107)	(0.079)	(0.093)	(0.037)	(0.072)	(0.036)	(0.041)
Observations	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232
R-squared	0.425	0.086	0.113	0.096	0.031	0.075	0.067	0.104
Mean, same-day coverage	0.444	0.500	0.121	0.116	0.096	0.643	0.149	0.076
Panel B: Sample of all news stories about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict								
Next-day coverage	0.273***	-0.002	0.220***	0.162**	0.096**	0.0124	0.059**	0.114***
	(0.053)	(0.098)	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.042)	(0.0651)	(0.029)	(0.034)
Next-day coverage × Palestinian attack	-0.345***	0.070	-0.099	0.053	-0.074	0.0202	0.014	-0.070
	(0.096)	(0.124)	(0.087)	(0.094)	(0.086)	(0.0804)	(0.040)	(0.048)
Story not about same-day or previous-day attack	-0.326***	-0.271***	-0.052	0.011	0.030	-0.378***	-0.056***	0.003
	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.0468)	(0.019)	(0.029)
Story about a particular attack	0.084**	0.049	0.045	0.087***	0.023	0.0932***	0.049***	0.028
	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.0340)	(0.013)	(0.025)
Story about Palestinian attack	0.187***	0.202***	0.133***	0.086***	0.127***	0.213***	0.079***	0.096***
	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.0329)	(0.012)	(0.020)
Observations	755	755	755	755	755	755	755	755
R-squared	0.337	0.198	0.108	0.099	0.057	0.413	0.222	0.114

Note: The table examines qualitative differences between same-day and next-day coverage of Israeli attacks on U.S. news. Panel A considers all news reports about a specific Israeli attack that occurred on the same day or previous day that do not mention contemporary or previous Palestinian attacks. Panel B considers all news reports about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All regressions include network and analyst fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by month×year are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The mean responses to the questions for sample of stories about a particular Israeli attack that took place on the same day and do not mention Palestinian attacks are presented in the last row of Panel A. The mean responses to the questions for the entire sample of videos are presented in Table A.3 in the online appendix.

TABLE 9: GOOGLE SEARCH VOLUME, CONFLICT-RELATED NEWS, AND TIMING OF ATTACKS

Dependent variable:	Log daily volume of Google searches for "Israeli-Palestinian conflict"			
Model:	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS	(4) OLS
Any conflict news, t × Israeli attack, same day	0.014	-0.058		
	(0.114)	(0.127)		
Any conflict news, t × Israeli attack, previous day	0.368***	0.295**		
	(0.101)	(0.127)		
Any conflict news, t-1 × Israeli attack, same day		0.047		
		(0.143)		
Any conflict news, t-1 × Israeli attack, previous day		0.329***		
		(0.119)		
Length of conflict news, t × Israeli attack, same day			-0.003	-0.044
			(0.034)	(0.040)
Length of conflict news, t × Israeli attack, previous day			0.109***	0.108***
			(0.030)	(0.039)
Length of conflict news, t-1 × Israeli attack, same day				-0.034
				(0.044)
Length of conflict news, t-1 × Israeli attack, previous day				0.114***
				(0.039)
Occurrence dummies and log victims of attacks on both sides, t and t-1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Occurrence dummies and log victims of attacks on both sides, t-2	No	Yes	No	Yes
FEs (DOW and month); linear time trend	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respective conflict news measure, t × No Israeli attack, t or t-1	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respective conflict news measure, t-1 × No Israeli attack, t-1 or t-2	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	2,773	2,741	2,773	2,741
R-squared	0.307	0.326	0.323	0.345
p-value: same-day coverage vs. previous-day coverage, t	0.053	0.133	0.072	0.052
p-value: same-day coverage vs. previous-day coverage, t-1	–	0.249	–	0.072
p-value: same-day coverage vs. previous-day coverage, (t-1)+(t)	–	0.170	–	0.053

Note: The table examines the relationship between Google searches for the "Israeli-Palestinian conflict" and the news coverage of attacks on the same or on the previous day. Fixed effects for the day of the week and calendar month as well as linear time trend and controls for the occurrence and severity of the attacks are included in all equations. Standard errors clustered by month×year are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

A. Online Appendix

Table A.1: Construction of the news-pressure variable

Panel A. Israel or Palestine are not on the news:

Date	Network	N	Headline	Length (secs)	Uncorrected News Pressure (secs)	Corrected News Pressure (secs)
15Jan2004	CBS	1	Weather Watch (Extreme Weather)	290		
15Jan2004	CBS	2	Iraq / New Government	30	Time devoted to top 3 non-conflict news stories (secs)	Time devotedto top 3 non-conflict news stories adjusted to the total length of non-conflict broadcast (secs)
15Jan2004	CBS	3	Atlanta, Georgia / Bush Protests	120		
15Jan2004	CBS	4	Campaign 04 / Iowa	160		
15Jan2004	CBS	5	Market Watch: Consumer Prices, Inflation, Stocks	20		
15Jan2004	CBS	6	Inside Story (Internet Child Pornography)	120		
15Jan2004	CBS	7	Space: Mars Exploration	20		(290+30+120)*810
15Jan2004	CBS	8	Flu Season	20	290+30+120	(810-0)
15Jan2004	CBS	9	Eye on America (Mad Cow Disease)	200		
15Jan2004	CBS	10	Iraq / Homecoming	140		
15-Jan-04	CBS	11	Good Night	10		
			total:	1130	440	440

Panel B. Israel or Palestine are covered in top three stories:

Date	Network	N	Headline	Length (secs)	Uncorrected News Pressure (secs)	Corrected News Pressure (secs)
11Jun2003	CBS	1	**Middle East / Israelis vs. Palestinians / Violence**	**200**		
11Jun2003	CBS	2	Iraq: After Saddam / Weapons of Mass Destruction	120	Time devoted to top 3 non-conflict news stories (secs)	Time devotedto top 3 non-conflict news stories adjusted to the total length of non-conflict broadcast (secs)
11Jun2003	CBS	3	Economy / Tax Cut Plan	150		
11Jun2003	CBS	4	Medicine: Monkeypox	160		
11Jun2003	CBS	5	Shreveport, Louisiana / Hudspeth Shooting	130		
11Jun2003	CBS	6	International News	70		
11Jun2003	CBS	7	California / Coma Birth	110		(120+150+160)*1030
11Jun2003	CBS	8	Eye on America (Bon Appetit!)	80	120+150+160	(1030-200)
11Jun2003	CBS	9	Good Night	10		
			total:	1030	430	533.6

Panel C. Israel or Palestine are covered, but not in top three stories:

Date	Network	N	Headline	Length (secs)	Uncorrected News Pressure (secs)	Corrected News Pressure (secs)
17Apr2001	CBS	1	Economy / Signs of Recovery	160		
17Apr2001	CBS	2	Economy / Intel Profit / Cisco Sales	140	Time devoted to top 3 non-conflict news stories (secs)	Time devotedto top 3 non-conflict news stories adjusted to the total length of non-conflict broadcast (secs)
17Apr2001	CBS	3	Bush / Environmental Policy / Lead Laws	130		
17Apr2001	CBS	4	**Middle East / Israelis vs. Palestinians / Violence**	**30**		
17Apr2001	CBS	5	US-China Relations / Negotiations	100		
17Apr2001	CBS	6	Vietnam / Mia Mission	20		
17Apr2001	CBS	7	Foot-and-Mouth Disease / Prevention	140		(160+140+130)*1130
17Apr2001	CBS	8	Weather Watch (Upper Midwest Floods)	30	160+140+130	(1130-30)
17Apr2001	CBS	9	Africa / Slave Ship / Child Slavery	130		
17Apr2001	CBS	10	Concorde Test Flight	30		
17Apr2001	CBS	11	Health Watch (St. John's Wort and Depression)	110		
17Apr2001	CBS	12	Health / Dietary Supplements / Poor	20		
17Apr2001	CBS	13	Health / Alcohol and Heart Disease Study	30		
17Apr2001	CBS	14	Ellis Island / Immigrant Data Base	50		
17Apr2001	CBS	15	Good Night	10		
			total:	1130	430	441.7

TABLE A.2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Variable	Source	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
News pressure (10 min.)	Vanderbilt News Archive	4,071	0.886	0.258	0.233	2.933
Uncorrected news pressure (10 min.)	Vanderbilt News Archive	4,071	0.867	0.264	0.017	2.933
Presence of conflict-related news stories	Vanderbilt News Archive	4,006	0.182	0.386	0	1
Number of conflict-related news stories	Vanderbilt News Archive	4,006	0.328	0.794	0	6
Length of conflict related stories (min.)	Vanderbilt News Archive	4,006	0.717	2.543	0	36
Log daily volume of Google searches for “Israeli-Palestinian conflict”	Google Trends	2,833	2.250	0.670	0	4.771
Occurrence of fatal Israeli attacks	B’Tselem	4,074	0.392	0.488	0	1
Occurrence of fatal Palestinian attacks	B’Tselem	4,074	0.068	0.252	0	1
Number of fatalities caused by Israeli attacks	B’Tselem	4,074	1.571	7.423	0	356
Number of fatalities caused by Palestinian attacks	B’Tselem	4,074	0.158	0.915	0	21
Log number of fatalities caused by Israeli attack	B’Tselem	4,074	0.493	0.738	0	5.878
Log number of fatalities caused by Palestinian attacks	B’Tselem	4,074	0.070	0.292	0	3.091
Occurrence of Israeli targeted attacks	B’Tselem	4,074	0.036	0.185	0	1
Occurrence of Israeli nontargeted attacks	B’Tselem	4,074	0.378	0.485	0	1
Victims of Israeli targeted attacks	B’Tselem	4,074	0.104	0.724	0	15
Victims of Israeli nontargeted attacks	B’Tselem	4,074	1.455	7.318	0	356
Occurrence of any Israeli attacks	UNOCHA	2,517	0.755	0.430	0	1
Occurrence of fatal Israeli attacks	UNOCHA	2,517	0.272	0.445	0	1
Occurrence of nonfatal Israeli attacks	UNOCHA	2,517	0.483	0.500	0	1
Occurrence of Israeli attacks with heavy weapons	UNOCHA	2,517	0.195	0.396	0	1
Occurrence of Israeli attacks with light weapons	UNOCHA	2,517	0.695	0.461	0	1
Occurrence of Israeli attacks in high-population-density areas	UNOCHA	2,517	0.453	0.498	0	1
Occurrence of Israeli attacks in low-population-density areas	UNOCHA	2,517	0.573	0.495	0	1
Fatal victims of Israeli attacks	UNOCHA	2,517	1.288	8.475	0	315
Nonfatal victims of Israeli attacks	UNOCHA	2,517	5.145	10.963	0	223
Victims of Israeli attacks with heavy weapons	UNOCHA	2,478	1.427	5.334	0	85
Victims of Israeli attacks with light weapons	UNOCHA	2,478	4.247	9.557	0	224
Victims of Israeli attacks in high-population-density areas	UNOCHA	2,515	3.554	13.101	0	324
Victims of Israeli attacks in low-population-density areas	UNOCHA	2,515	2.871	5.569	0	91
High intensity of the conflict (Intifada, Defensive Shield and Cast Lead)	–	4,074	0.411	0.521	0	2
Political/sports events	politics1.com	4,073	0.039	0.193	0	1
Disasters	IDD	4,073	0.026	0.159	0	1

TABLE A.3: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT-RELATED VIDEOS

Num.	Question	% Yes
1	First name, gender and age of the person watching the newscast	–
2	Date and time of the newscast	–
3	Network of the newscast	–
4	Does the newscast focus on a particular military attack? (Yes/No)	62
5	Does the newscast focus on an Israeli attack against Palestinians? (Yes/No)	54
6	Does the newscast focus on a Palestinian attack against Israelis? (Yes/No)	44
7	Did this attack occur the same day of the newscast? (Yes/No)	66
8	Did this attack occur on the day before the newscast? (Yes/No)	14
9	Is the newscast based on an on-site report? (Yes/No)	22
10	Is the news correspondent interviewed by the host of the news program? (Yes/No)	13
11	Does the newscast report information about the weapon or weapons used in this attack? (Yes/No)	65
12	Does the newscast report information on the exact location of this attack? (Yes/No)	46
13	Does the newscast report information on the number of victims (if any) caused by the attack? (Yes/No)	65
14	Does the newscast report information on the number of civilian victims (if any) caused by the attack? (Yes/No)	48
15	Does the newscast show images of the actual site of the attack? (Yes/No)	47
16	Does the newscast show footage of the immediate aftermath of the incident? (Yes/No)	31
17	Do photos of the victims of this attack appear in the newscast? (Yes/No)	4
18	Does the newscast show footage of the victims of this attack? (Yes/No)	44
19	Does the newscast report personal information of the civilian victims (e.g., first or last name, age, family situation, etc.)? (Yes/No)	19
20	Does the newscast include footage of burials and/or scenes of mourning by family members? (Yes/No)	14
21	Does the newscast include interviews with witnesses of the accident? (Yes/No)	12
22	Does the newscast include interviews with friends and/or relatives of the civilian victims? (Yes/No)	5
23	Does the newscast report information about the reaction of Israeli authorities to the incident? (Yes/No)	47
24	Does the newscast report information about the reaction of Palestinian authorities to the incident? (Yes/No)	30
25	Overall, how emotional is the newscast on a hypothetical scale from 1 to 4: 1 being not emotional at all, 2 just a little bit emotional, 3 emotional, 4 very emotional	–
26	Overall, how would you assess the tone of the newscast on a hypothetical scale from -3 to 3: -3 being very pro-Palestine, -2 pro-Palestine, -1 somewhat pro-Palestine, 0 neutral, 1 somewhat pro-Israel, 2 pro-Israel, and 3 very pro-Israel	–

Note: Total number of responses to each question is 755. The distribution of answers to question # 25 is as follows: “0” 17; “1” 492; “2” 148; “3” 86; “4” 12. The distribution of answers to question # 26 is as follows: “-3” 2; “-2” 28; “-1” 53; “0” 613; “1” 29; “2” 27; “3” 3.

TABLE A.4: NEWS PRESSURE AND MAJOR EVENTS

	News Pressure		News Pressure		News Pressure		News Pressure
Presidential inauguration	0.639***	Presidential inauguration	0.634***	World Cup (soccer)	0.103**	Major events	0.168***
	(0.198)		(0.201)		(0.051)		(0.037)
General election	0.425***	Presidential inauguration, t+1	0.062	March Madness (basketball)	0.077	*Including:*	
	(0.102)		(0.209)		(0.052)	Presidential inauguration, t	
NH presidential primaries	0.397***	Presidential inauguration, t-1	-0.155***	NBA Finals (basketball)	0.026	General election, t-2, t-1, t, t+1, t+2	
	(0.040)		(0.047)		(0.032)	NH presidential primaries, t-1, t, t+1	
Main national party conventions	0.293***	General election	0.440***	World Series (baseball)	0.025	Super Tuesday, t-1, t, t+1	
	(0.111)		(0.103)		(0.063)	All presidential caucuses, t	
Super Tuesday	0.221	General election, t+2	0.388***	Olympics	-0.069	World Cup, t	
	(0.213)		(0.092)		(0.044)		
Iowa caucus	0.186	General election, t+1	0.264***	UEFA European Cup (soccer)	0.007		
	(0.120)		(0.093)		(0.048)		
State of the Union address	0.170***	General election, t-1	0.370***	Other major U.S. sports events	-0.007		
	(0.048)		(0.079)		(0.036)		
Other presidential caucuses	0.159***	General election, t-2	0.017				
	(0.043)		(0.057)				
Other presidential primaries	-0.016	NH presidential primaries	0.391***				
	(0.047)		(0.040)				
Statewide elections	0.071	NH presidential primaries, t+1	0.310***				
	(0.111)		(0.036)				
Start of congress sessions	-0.019	NH presidential primaries, t-1	0.250***				
	(0.115)		(0.050)				
Special Congressional elections	0.013	All presidential caucuses	0.153***				
	(0.040)		(0.044)				
Gubernatorial elections	-0.042	All presidential caucuses, t+1	-0.004				
	(0.038)		(0.088)				
State primaries	-0.004	All presidential caucuses, t-1	0.017				
	(0.025)		(0.070)				
Special senate elections	0.048	Super Tuesday	0.219				
	(0.141)		(0.204)				
		Super Tuesday, t+1	0.133				
			(0.232)				
		Super Tuesday, t-1	0.287**				
			(0.135)				
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes
Observations	4,071	Observations	4,067	Observations	4,071	Observations	4,071
R-squared	0.117	R-squared	0.122	R-squared	0.106	R-squared	0.113

TABLE A.5: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND NEWS PRESSURE - ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

PANEL A: OCCURRENCE OF ATTACKS

Dependent variable:	(1) Occurrence	(2) Occurrence	(3) Occurrence	(4) Occurrence	(5) Occurrence	(6) Occurrence
Model:	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
News pressure t+1	0.081**	0.080**	0.077**	0.086**	0.094***	0.087**
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.034)
Same-day NP	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
7 lags of NP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
7 leads of NP	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
7 lags or Israeli attacks	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	No Gaza	Full	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza
SEs	N-W	N-W	Cl (month × year)	N-W	N-W	N-W
Observations	4,024	4,047	4,024	4,025	4,046	4,007
R-squared	0.219	0.188	0.196	0.196	0.196	0.197

PANEL B: NUMBER OF VICTIMS

Dependent variable:	(1) Num. victims	(2) Num. victims	(3) Num. victims	(4) Num. victims	(5) Num. victims	(6) Num. victims
Model:	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.
News pressure t+1	0.413***	0.597***	0.507***	0.491***	0.499***	0.385**
	(0.148)	(0.170)	(0.194)	(0.154)	(0.143)	(0.151)
Same-day NP	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
7 lags of NP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
7 leads of NP	No	No	No	No	Yes	No
7 lags or Isr attacks	No	No	No	No	No	No
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	No Gaza	Full	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza
SEs	N-W	N-W	Cl (month × year)	N-W	N-W	N-W
Observations	4,024	4,047	4,024	4,025	4,046	4,007
Pseudo R-squared	0.086	0.055	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.072

TABLE A.6: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND NEWS PRESSURE CONTROLLING FOR JEWISH AND MUSLIM HOLIDAYS

Dependent variable:	(1) Occurrence	(2) Occurrence	(3) Occurrence	(4) Ln(1+victims)	(5) Ln(1+victims)	(6) Ln(1+victims)	(7) Num. victims
Model:	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.
News pressure t	0.072**	0.029	0.024	0.128**	0.056	0.024	-0.008
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.143)
News pressure t+1		0.083**	0.078**		0.138***	0.120**	0.499***
		(0.033)	(0.035)		(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.159)
News pressure t-1			-0.025			-0.036	-0.209
			(0.035)			(0.046)	(0.157)
Chanukah	0.030	0.032	0.029	0.114	0.118	0.112	0.245
	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.125)	(0.111)	(0.103)	(0.227)
Lag B'Omer	-0.045	-0.046	-0.053	-0.010	-0.013	-0.031	-0.229
	(0.111)	(0.120)	(0.113)	(0.177)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.541)
Leil Selichot	0.128	0.126	0.141	0.166	0.165	0.187	0.446
	(0.171)	(0.166)	(0.162)	(0.197)	(0.196)	(0.195)	(0.470)
Pesach	-0.069	-0.067	-0.105**	-0.066	-0.063	-0.126	-0.224
	(0.054)	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.101)	(0.146)	(0.132)	(0.408)
Pesach Sheni	0.310***	0.307***	0.309***	0.150*	0.146	0.158	-0.119
	(0.098)	(0.109)	(0.109)	(0.087)	(0.104)	(0.100)	(0.246)
Purim	0.057	0.060	0.041	0.084	0.089	0.063	-0.017
	(0.082)	(0.093)	(0.085)	(0.180)	(0.184)	(0.180)	(0.437)
Purim Katan	-0.079	-0.082	-0.099	0.190	0.184	0.157	0.371
	(0.178)	(0.171)	(0.151)	(0.454)	(0.440)	(0.390)	(0.719)
Rosh Hashana	-0.130*	-0.129*	-0.176**	-0.071	-0.069	-0.201**	-0.729
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.104)	(0.126)	(0.096)	(0.464)
Shavuot	-0.145**	-0.143**	-0.124*	-0.239***	-0.235***	-0.200**	-1.027***
	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.070)	(0.087)	(0.076)	(0.086)	(0.347)
Shmini Atzeret	0.058	0.065	0.062	0.191	0.203	0.200	0.255
	(0.104)	(0.112)	(0.108)	(0.194)	(0.190)	(0.184)	(0.398)
Shushan Purim	0.103	0.096	0.080	-0.149	-0.161	-0.185	-0.786
	(0.152)	(0.156)	(0.153)	(0.158)	(0.141)	(0.141)	(0.542)
Simchat Torah	-0.263***	-0.266***	-0.262***	-0.287**	-0.291**	-0.275**	-0.978*
	(0.101)	(0.095)	(0.096)	(0.131)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.563)
Sukkot	0.097**	0.096*	0.104*	0.217**	0.216	0.236*	0.422**
	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.054)	(0.107)	(0.133)	(0.122)	(0.213)
Tish'a B'Av	-0.166**	-0.166**	-0.152*	-0.136	-0.136	-0.122	-0.687
	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.081)	(0.100)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.420)
Tu B'Av	-0.165	-0.184	-0.173	-0.098	-0.128	-0.106	-0.620
	(0.102)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.173)	(0.184)	(0.183)	(0.584)
Tu BiShvat	-0.008	-0.014	-0.044	-0.056	-0.065	-0.116	-0.379
	(0.155)	(0.137)	(0.148)	(0.164)	(0.144)	(0.165)	(0.577)
Yom Kippur	-0.082	-0.086	-0.082	-0.207*	-0.214*	-0.194	-0.703
	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.081)	(0.116)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.497)
Ashura	0.099	0.088	0.090	0.220	0.202	0.198	-0.006
	(0.123)	(0.128)	(0.120)	(0.187)	(0.198)	(0.201)	(0.354)
Id al-Adha	-0.048	-0.047	-0.047	-0.018	-0.017	-0.006	0.091
	(0.108)	(0.112)	(0.121)	(0.171)	(0.180)	(0.193)	(0.582)
Lailat al Bara'at	0.091	0.085	0.108	0.243	0.233	0.269	0.565
	(0.112)	(0.113)	(0.117)	(0.236)	(0.235)	(0.233)	(0.393)
Lailat al Miraj	-0.154	-0.152	-0.104	-0.275*	-0.270*	-0.198	-1.052**
	(0.122)	(0.123)	(0.116)	(0.146)	(0.148)	(0.129)	(0.490)
Laylat al-Qadr	0.008	-0.001	-0.005	0.100	0.086	0.084	0.108
	(0.120)	(0.119)	(0.113)	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.168)	(0.382)
Mawlid al-Nabi	-0.015	-0.017	-0.030	-0.188	-0.191*	-0.212*	-1.127***
	(0.134)	(0.133)	(0.127)	(0.114)	(0.113)	(0.108)	(0.376)
Ra's al-Sana	-0.005	-0.007	0.017	-0.022	-0.024	0.005	-0.501
	(0.123)	(0.119)	(0.124)	(0.141)	(0.138)	(0.140)	(0.358)
Ramadan	0.027	0.026	0.025	-0.012	-0.013	-0.009	0.055
	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.063)	(0.049)	(0.046)	(0.160)
7 lags of NP	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Previous Pal. attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	4,048	4,045	4,024	4,048	4,045	4,024	4,024
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.188	0.190	0.203	0.182	0.184	0.203	0.073

TABLE A.7: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND NEWS PRESSURE (BASED ON THE LONGEST THREE NEWS STORIES)

Dependent variable:	(1) Occurrence	(2) Occurrence	(3) Occurrence	(4) Ln(1+victims)	(5) Ln(1+victims)	(6) Ln(1+victims)	(7) Num. victims
Model:	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.
News pressure t	0.100***	0.044	0.034	0.207***	0.120**	0.060	-0.014
(longest 3 stories)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.064)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.201)
News pressure t+1		0.108***	0.098**		0.165***	0.126**	0.523***
(longest 3 stories)		(0.039)	(0.040)		(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.197)
News pressure t-1			-0.012			0.019	0.178
(longest 3 stories)			(0.040)			(0.053)	(0.177)
Palestinian attacks			0.102***			0.217***	0.420***
(previous day)			(0.030)			(0.056)	(0.101)
Palestinian attacks			0.086***			0.168***	0.397***
(previous week)			(0.021)			(0.036)	(0.090)
Palestinian attacks			0.096***			0.137***	0.296***
(week before previous)			(0.022)			(0.035)	(0.086)
7 lags of NP	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza
Observations	4,048	4,045	4,024	4,048	4,045	4,024	4,024
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.182	0.184	0.197	0.177	0.179	0.198	0.070

TABLE A.8: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND NEWS PRESSURE: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ISRAELI ADMINISTRATIONS

Dependent variable:	(1) Occurrence	(2) Occurrence	(3) Occurrence	(4) Occurrence	(5) Occurrence	(6) Num. victims	(7) Num. victims	(8) Num. victims	(9) Num. victims	(10) Num. victims
Model:	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.
News pressure t+1	0.072**	0.091**	0.081**	0.102**	0.074**	0.477***	0.569**	0.491***	0.497***	0.487***
	(0.164)	(0.248)	(0.186)	(0.156)	(0.166)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.034)
Barak administration	-0.202*					-0.771**				
	(0.110)					(0.380)				
News pressure t+1 × Barak administration	0.224**					0.227				
	(0.108)					(0.348)				
Sharon administration		-0.065					-0.243			
		(0.073)					(0.349)			
News pressure t+1 × Sharon administration		-0.017					-0.149			
		(0.066)					(0.318)			
Olmert administration			0.113					0.860**		
			(0.083)					(0.431)		
News pressure t+1 × Olmert administration			0.009					-0.047		
			(0.085)					(0.398)		
Netanyahu administration				-0.029					-0.414	
				(0.075)					(0.625)	
News pressure t+1 × Netanyahu administration				-0.062					0.001	
				(0.065)					(0.539)	
7 lags of NP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza
Administrations	All	All	All	All	All but Barak's	All	All	All	All	All but Barak's
Observations	4,025	4,025	4,025	4,025	3,873	4,025	4,025	4,025	4,025	3,873
R-squared	0.195	0.195	0.196	0.195	0.191	0.070	0.070	0.071	0.070	0.069

TABLE A.9: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND NEWS PRESSURE: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS

Dependent variable:	(1) Occurrence	(2) Occurrence	(3) Occurrence	(4) Occurrence	(5) Occurrence	(6) Num. victims	(7) Num. victims	(8) Num. victims	(9) Num. victims	(10) Num. victims
Model:	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.
News pressure t+1	0.078*	0.073**	0.097*	0.091**	0.075**	0.447***	0.474***	0.649*	0.470***	0.477***
	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.164)	(0.163)	(0.375)	(0.156)	(0.164)
Republican President	-0.047					-0.576				
	(0.144)					(0.491)				
News pressure t+1 × Republican President	0.019					0.202				
	(0.064)					(0.407)				
Clinton administration		-0.173					-0.627			
		(0.154)					(0.479)			
News pressure t+1 × Clinton administration		0.240**					0.394			
		(0.115)					(0.353)			
Bush administration			0.047					0.576		
			(0.144)					(0.491)		
News pressure t+1 × Bush administration			-0.019					-0.202		
			(0.064)					(0.407)		
Obama administration				-0.709***					-1.714***	
				(0.106)					(0.596)	
News pressure t+1 × Obama administration				-0.036					0.099	
				(0.065)					(0.524)	
7 lags of NP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza
Administrations	All	All	All	All	All but Clinton's	All	All	All	All	All but Clinton's
Observations	4,025	4,025	4,025	4,025	3,919	4,025	4,025	4,025	4,025	3,919
R-squared	0.194	0.195	0.194	0.195	0.189	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.069

TABLE A.10: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND NEWS PRESSURE: SECOND INTIFADA, PEACE PROCESS, AND PEACE TALKS

Dependent variable:	(1) Occurrence	(2) Occurrence	(3) Occurrence	(4) Num. victims	(5) Num. victims	(6) Num. victims
Model:	OLS	OLS	OLS	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.	ML Neg. Bin.
News pressure t+1	0.104*	0.103*	0.085**	0.422**	1.044***	0.488***
	(0.054)	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.188)	(0.290)	(0.154)
Post-Intifada	-0.254**			-1.041**		
	(0.101)			(0.417)		
News pressure t+1 ×	-0.029			0.145		
Post-Intifada	(0.067)			(0.323)		
Ongoing peace process		-0.008			0.486	
		(0.063)			(0.305)	
News pressure t+1 ×		-0.026			-0.811**	
Ongoing peace process		(0.069)			(0.334)	
Ongoing peace talks			-0.085			-1.313
			(0.295)			(1.443)
News pressure t+1 ×			0.076			1.715
Ongoing peace talks			(0.334)			(1.858)
7 lags of NP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza
Observations	4,025	4,025	4,025	4,025	4,025	4,025
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.198	0.196	0.196	0.070	0.071	0.069

TABLE A.11: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND PREDICTABLE NEWS PRESSURE CONTROLLING FOR JEWISH AND MUSLIM HOLIDAYS (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent variable:	P t+1	Occurrence	Occurrence	Num. victims	Num. victims
Model:	OLS 1st stage	OLS IV 2nd stage	OLS Reduced form	ML Neg. Bin. IV 2nd stage	ML Neg. Bin. Reduced form
Political/Sport events	0.173***		0.106**		0.401**
	(0.035)		(0.042)		(0.174)
News pressure t+1		0.615**		2.494***	
		(0.259)		(0.904)	
Chanukah	-0.067	0.067	0.026	0.461*	0.249
	(0.048)	(0.060)	(0.068)	(0.245)	(0.292)
Lag B'Omer	0.078	-0.097	-0.050	-0.358	-0.193
	(0.069)	(0.121)	(0.107)	(0.578)	(0.535)
Leil Selichot	-0.041	0.147	0.122	0.407	0.301
	(0.077)	(0.178)	(0.171)	(0.514)	(0.464)
Pesach	-0.044	-0.078	-0.105**	-0.005	-0.201
	(0.041)	(0.062)	(0.045)	(0.376)	(0.379)
Pesach Sheni	-0.006	0.319***	0.316***	-0.113	-0.122
	(0.058)	(0.105)	(0.099)	(0.272)	(0.232)
Purim	-0.030	0.061	0.042	0.191	0.077
	(0.063)	(0.075)	(0.079)	(0.447)	(0.427)
Purim Katan	0.043	-0.112	-0.084	0.464	0.497
	(0.062)	(0.139)	(0.146)	(0.679)	(0.739)
Rosh Hashana	-0.076	-0.098	-0.144*	0.080	-0.141
	(0.051)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.359)	(0.325)
Shavuot	-0.052	-0.113*	-0.145***	-0.914**	-1.056***
	(0.039)	(0.061)	(0.052)	(0.374)	(0.353)
Shmini Atzeret	-0.069	0.090	0.047	0.341	0.096
	(0.076)	(0.120)	(0.102)	(0.508)	(0.437)
Shushan Purim	0.063	0.051	0.090	-1.081*	-0.788
	(0.065)	(0.169)	(0.152)	(0.573)	(0.559)
Simchat Torah	-0.005	-0.267***	-0.270***	-1.001*	-1.109**
	(0.040)	(0.096)	(0.101)	(0.513)	(0.516)
Sukkot	-0.030	0.104**	0.086**	0.462**	0.350**
	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.225)	(0.173)
Tish'a B'Av	0.035	-0.171**	-0.149*	-0.621	-0.629
	(0.040)	(0.071)	(0.080)	(0.405)	(0.434)
Tu B'Av	0.237	-0.295	-0.148	-0.918	-0.409
	(0.194)	(0.190)	(0.104)	(0.810)	(0.585)
Tu BiShvat	0.021	-0.055	-0.042	-0.531	-0.397
	(0.037)	(0.152)	(0.161)	(0.535)	(0.632)
Yom Kippur	0.020	-0.096	-0.083	-0.765	-0.673
	(0.064)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.534)	(0.525)
Ashura	0.165**	-0.010	0.091	-0.274	0.084
	(0.077)	(0.133)	(0.119)	(0.377)	(0.320)
Id al-Adha	-0.028	-0.102	-0.121	0.093	-0.013
	(0.048)	(0.124)	(0.117)	(0.614)	(0.546)
Lailat al Bara'at	0.100*	0.052	0.113	0.425	0.607
	(0.052)	(0.121)	(0.116)	(0.424)	(0.388)
Lailat al Miraj	-0.030	-0.101	-0.120	-0.940*	-1.050**
	(0.083)	(0.120)	(0.117)	(0.555)	(0.486)
Laylat al-Qadr	0.092	-0.053	0.004	-0.056	0.201
	(0.113)	(0.122)	(0.116)	(0.447)	(0.390)
Mawlid al-Nabi	-0.039	-0.008	-0.033	-1.009***	-1.130***
	(0.076)	(0.124)	(0.132)	(0.371)	(0.383)
Ra's al-Sana	-0.003	0.017	0.015	-0.383	-0.447
	(0.078)	(0.110)	(0.127)	(0.311)	(0.382)
Ramadan	0.037	0.000	0.023	-0.085	0.062
	(0.030)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.197)	(0.205)
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza
Observations	4,047	4,047	4,050	4,047	4,050
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.125	0.133	0.201	—	0.072

TABLE A.12: ISRAELI ATTACKS AND PREDICTABLE NEWS PRESSURE BASED ON THE LONGEST THREE NEWS STORIES (IV)

Dependent variable:	(1) NP t+1 (longest 3 stories)	(2) Occurrence	(3) Num. victims
Model:	OLS 1st stage	OLS IV 2nd stage	ML Neg. Bin. IV 2nd stage
Political/Sport events	0.127*** (0.038)		
News pressure t+1 (longest 3 stories)		0.861** (0.376)	3.487** (1.378)
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes	Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample	No Gaza	No Gaza	No Gaza
Observations	4,046	4,046	4,046
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.095	0.085	—
F excl. instr.	10.90	10.90	10.90

TABLE A.13: ROBUSTNESS OF TABLE 6 TO CONTROLLING FOR NEWS PRESSURE AT T
(FOR MULTINOMIAL LOGIT: MARGINAL EFFECTS REPORTED)

Model:	(1) Multinomial Logit, daily outcome relative to days with no attack: (a)	(b)	(2) ML Neg.Bin.	(3) ML Neg.Bin.
PANEL A: TARGETED VS. NONTARGETED ATTACKS, SAMPLE: 2001-2011				
Dependent variable:	Days with targeted attacks	Days with nontargeted attacks	Victims of targ. killings	Victims of nontarg. attacks
News pressure t+1	0.009	0.082*	0.507	0.484***
	(0.010)	(0.044)	(0.440)	(0.166)
Observations	4,024		4,024	4,024
p-value for (a) = (b)	0.110			
PANEL B: FATAL VS. NONFATAL ATTACKS, SAMPLE: 2005-2011				
Dependent variable:	Days with nonfatal attacks	Days with fatal attacks	Injuries	Fatalities
News pressure t+1	-0.036	0.074	0.006	0.677***
	(0.057)	(0.049)	(0.190)	(0.250)
Observations	2,484		1,824	2,484
p-value for (a) = (b)	0.255			
PANEL C: ATTACKS IN LESS VS. MORE DENSELY POPULATED AREAS (LDP VS. MDP), SAMPLE: 2005-2011				
Dependent variable:	Days with attacks, LDP areas	Days with attacks, MDP areas	Victims, LDP areas	Victims, MDP areas
News pressure t+1	-0.053	0.088*	0.047	0.611**
	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.166)	(0.250)
Observations	2,482		2,482	2,482
p-value for (a) = (b)	0.161			
PANEL D: ATTACKS WITH LIGHT WEAPONS (LW) VS. HEAVY WEAPONS (HW), SAMPLE: 2005-2011				
Dependent variable:	Days with attacks using LW only	Days with attacks using HW	Victims w. light W	Victims w. heavy W
News pressure t+1	-0.032	0.075**	-0.047	0.641*
	(0.048)	(0.035)	(0.179)	(0.365)
Observations	2,448		1,961	2,448
p-value for (a) = (b)	0.137			
News pressure (lags)	Yes		Yes	Yes
News pressure t	Yes		Yes	Yes
Prior Palestinian attacks	Yes		Yes	Yes
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes		Yes	Yes

TABLE A.14: COUNTERFACTUAL EXERCISE

	Mean news pressure	Percentile of news pressure: 10	50	90
Predicted length of conflict-related news per attack (minutes)	1.17	1.42	1.21	0.91
Predicted probability of news coverage of an attack, %	27.0	29.2	27.4	24.3
Predicted probability of an attack on a given day, %	38.85	22.09	35.59	60.11
	Scenario 1: Time displacement			
Predicted number of attacks per month, on average	12	12	12	12
Predicted number of victims per month, on average	25	25	25	25
	Scenario 2: Attack cancellation			
Predicted number of attacks per month	12	7	11	18
Predicted number of victims per month	25	20	34	85

TABLE A.15: DIFFERENCE IN CONTENT BETWEEN SAME-DAY AND NEXT-DAY COVERAGE (OTHER DIMENSIONS)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Content:	On-site report	Interview of correspondent	Info on weapon	Info on number of victims	Images of site of attack	Footage of the aftermath	Photos of victims	Video of victims	Reaction of Palestinian authorities	Reaction of Israeli authorities	Emotional scale	Tone of the story
	q9	q10	q11	q13	q15	q16	q17	q18	q24	q23	q25	q26
Panel A: Sample of news stories about an Israeli attack occurred on the same or previous day not mentioning Palestinian attacks												
Next-day coverage	-0.074	-0.043	0.049	-0.047	-0.062	0.068	0.027	0.083	-0.032	-0.085	0.043	0.151
	(0.112)	(0.061)	(0.069)	(0.084)	(0.065)	(0.068)	(0.023)	(0.081)	(0.088)	(0.076)	(0.161)	(0.165)
Observations	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232	232
R-squared	0.125	0.195	0.033	0.067	0.466	0.369	0.065	0.041	0.036	0.163	0.412	0.026
Mean, same-day coverage	0.242	0.126	0.712	0.717	0.525	0.364	0.010	0.404	0.273	0.510	1.394	-0.106
Panel B: Sample of all news stories about Israeli-Palestinian conflict												
Next-day coverage	-0.014	-0.033	0.065	-0.026	-0.057	0.073	0.033	0.085	0.009	-0.098	0.188	0.103
	(0.094)	(0.051)	(0.065)	(0.077)	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.025)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.145)	(0.153)
Next-day coverage × Palestinian attack	-0.064	0.102	-0.017	0.008	-0.034	-0.022	0.015	0.035	0.052	0.079	-0.273*	-0.083
	(0.090)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.103)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.045)	(0.098)	(0.088)	(0.109)	(0.155)	(0.188)
Story not about same-day or previous day attack	-0.109***	-0.024	-0.499***	-0.364***	-0.340***	-0.202***	0.035	-0.177***	-0.033	-0.100*	-0.008	0.084
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.131)	(0.074)
Story about a particular attack	0.018	0.067*	0.089**	0.141***	0.136***	0.091**	0.021	0.094**	0.084*	0.168***	0.304***	0.005
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.075)	(0.078)
Story about Palestinian attack	0.057	0.045*	0.189***	0.249***	0.143***	0.095***	0.047**	0.249***	0.130***	0.130***	0.292***	0.231***
	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.032)	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.070)	(0.066)
Observations	755	755	755	755	755	755	755	755	755	755	755	755
R-squared	0.120	0.194	0.370	0.330	0.471	0.342	0.045	0.184	0.069	0.152	0.297	0.032

TABLE A.16: LINKS TO SOME EXAMPLES OF THE PRESS COVERAGE OF THE OFFICIAL U.S. REACTION TO ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST PALESTINIANS DURING OUR SAMPLE PERIOD

11/24/2000:	http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2000/ss-israel-11-24.html (accessed on March 4, 2016)
8/1/2001:	http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/08/01/powell.mideast/index.html (accessed on March 4, 2016)
25/10/2001:	http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/stories/s400092.htm (accessed on March 4, 2016)
4/7/2002:	http://articles.latimes.com/2002/apr/07/news/mn-36646 (accessed on March 4, 2016)
4/20/2002:	http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/04/20/mideast/index.html (accessed on March 4, 2016)
4/18/2004:	http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3635907.stm (accessed on March 4, 2016)
6/27/2006:	http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1656254/posts (accessed on March 4, 2016)
6/28/2006:	http://www.oneindia.com/2006/06/28/white-house-israel-has-right-to-defend-itself-1151510723.html (accessed on March 4, 2016)
5/21/2007:	http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3403193,00.html (accessed on March 4, 2016)
3/3/2008:	http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7274929.stm (accessed on March 4, 2016)
12/27/2008:	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/3982001/Israels-heaviest-ever-air-strikes-on-Gaza-strip-kill-hundreds.html (accessed on March 4, 2016)
1/5/2009:	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/4123767/Israeli-forces-kill-five-Palestinian-children-in-Gaza.html (accessed on March 4, 2016)
1/26/2010:	http://www.haaretz.com/news/u-s-lawmakers-to-obama-press-israel-to-ease-gaza-siege-1.262138 (accessed on March 4, 2016)

FIGURE A.1: FRONT-PAGE PRESS COVERAGE OF UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AT THE TIME OF IMPORTANT SPORTS EVENTS

Example 1: Beijing Olympics and Russia-Georgia war

Los Angeles Times

Saturday, August 9, 2008

Fighting in Caucasus intensifies

Backed by airstrikes, Russia confronts Georgia for attacking a breakaway republic. Civilians are killed.

The glow of humanity in Olympic fireworks

BILL PLASCHKE

Beijing 2008

A TIMES INVESTIGATION

Leader's kin get union business

Their firms receive big sums from SEIU local and a related charity.

Example 2: FIFA World cup and Israeli attack on Gaza

Le Monde

L'UMP ÉCHAPPE À LA FAILLITE, MAIS PAS AU RISQUE D'IMPLOSION

Israël : des missiles du Hamas atteignent Jérusalem et Tel-Aviv

Budget : le plan de rigueur sans précédent de Hollande

« Le Monde » dévoile le détail des coupes budgétaires pour 2015-2017 : les ministères de la défense, de l'écologie et l'audiovisuel sont à la diète ; les crédits de l'éducation, de la recherche et de l'intérieur sont préservés

Les dépenses de fonctionnement de l'Etat et des opérateurs publics seront réduites

Le gouvernement est parvenu à faire voter les mesures du pacte de responsabilité

LE BRÉSIL TRAUMATISÉ PAR UNE DÉROUTE HISTORIQUE

La Seleçao a subi une défaite inédite face à l'Allemagne (7-1) en demi-finale de sa Coupe du monde

Récits d'une soirée de cauchemar, entre larmes de colère et rires de honte

Example 3: FIFA World cup and "Save the Thief" Decree

LA STAMPA

GIOVEDÌ 14 LUGLIO 1994

E' slittato il condono edilizio

Fisco, da oggi si patteggia

Battuta la Bulgaria (2-1). A fine gara Roberto in lacrime portato in trionfo dai compagni

Esplode Baggio, azzurri in finale

Due gol-favola, domenica la sfida col Brasile

I PROFETI SCONFITTI

IL POETA DELL'ARRIGO

Avvisi di garanzia, obbligo di segreto per i giornali. Escono in duemila, fuori anche Di Donato e De Lorenzo

Scatta il decreto contro le manette facili

Il carcere preventivo resta in vigore solo per i reati più gravi

LO SLALOM FISCALE

Finanzieri, un altro suicidio

Letizia Moratti presidente Rai

Torna la pace sull'Alitalia

AUGUSTO MINZOLINI

LA FINE DELLA RIVOLUZIONE

FIGURE A.2: THE DISTRIBUTION OF NEWS PRESSURE, THE U.S. TV NETWORKS



Note: The figure reports the distributions of corrected and uncorrected news-pressure measures constructed on the entire sample (2000-2011). The unit of measurement is 10 minutes. The blue line represents the corresponding Epanechnikov Kernel density estimate. The red lines represent the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles of the distribution.

FIGURE A.3: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN ATTACKS AND U.S. NEWS PRESSURE, LAGS AND LEADS OF NEWS PRESSURE INCLUDED ONE BY ONE



Note: The figure reports the estimated coefficients (and respective 90% confidence intervals for Newey-West standard errors) from the regressions of occurrence of Israeli and Palestinian attacks on the lags and leads of news pressure included in the regression one by one. The two upper plots use the baseline (corrected) news-pressure measure; and the two lower plots – the uncorrected news pressure. The covariates includes year, calendar-month, and day-of-the-week fixed effects, and controls for the occurrence of attacks of the other side of the conflict one day before, one week before, and two weeks before. The Gaza War is excluded from the sample.

FIGURE A.4: NON-PARAMETRIC LOCAL LINEAR LEAST SQUARES BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISRAELI ATTACKS AND NEXT-DAY NEWS PRESSURE



Note: The figure reports nonparametric locally weighted regressions of occurrence and log severity of Israeli attacks on the next-day news pressure. Vertical lines indicate the median and the 99th percentile of the distribution of news pressure.

FIGURE A.5: FREQUENCY AND THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS OF ISRAELI ATTACKS BY QUINTILES OF NEXT-DAY NEWS PRESSURE





FIGURE A.6: VOLUME OF GOOGLE SEARCHES FOLLOWING NEWS ABOUT ISRAELI ATTACKS



Note: The figure reports the mean log daily volume of google searches following the same-day and next-day news coverage of an Israeli attack when there were no Palestinian attacks either on the same or on the previous day.

B. Proof of the Theorem 1

Proof. First, consider infinitesimal change in c and derive the condition for the derivative $\frac{dP}{dc}$:

$$P = \frac{30x(c)}{x(c)+y(c)} \tag{A.1}$$

$$\frac{dP(c)}{dc} = \frac{30}{(x(c)+y(c))^2}\left[\frac{dx(c)}{dc}[x(c)+y(c)] - x(c)\left[\frac{dx(c)}{dc}+\frac{dy(c)}{dc}\right]\right] = \tag{A.2}$$

$$= \frac{30x(c)y(c)}{(x(c)+y(c))^2}\left[\frac{\frac{dx(c)}{dc}}{x(c)} - \frac{\frac{dy(c)}{dc}}{y(c)}\right] \tag{A.3}$$

Note that:

$$\frac{30x(c)y(c)}{(x(c)+y(c))^2} > 0 \tag{A.4}$$

Thus, $\frac{dP}{dc}$ has the same sign as $\left[\frac{\frac{dx(c)}{dc}}{x(c)} - \frac{\frac{dy(c)}{dc}}{y(c)}\right]$ and as $\left[\frac{d\log(x(c))}{dc} - \frac{d\log(y(c))}{dc}\right]$.

Statements 1, 2, and 3 follow immediately. Similarly, one can derive the condition for corrected news pressure without conflict news to be equal to corrected news pressure with conflict news, i.e., $P|_{(c=0)}$=$P|_{(c>0)}$. By definition, $x = \frac{30\widetilde{x}}{\widetilde{x}+\widetilde{y}}$. Substituting for $\widetilde{y} = 30-c-\widetilde{x}$ and re-arranging terms yields:$\widetilde{x} = x\frac{(30-c)}{30}$. Re-writing the same expression in terms of y and $\widetilde{y}$, using the fact that $x = 30-y$ and $\widetilde{x} = 30-c-\widetilde{y}$, one gets: $\widetilde{y} = y\frac{(30-c)}{30}$. Thus, $\widetilde{y} = y\frac{(30-c)}{30}$ and $\widetilde{x} = x\frac{(30-c)}{30}$ and, therefore, $P|_{(c=0)}$=$P|_{(c>0)}$ iff $\frac{\widetilde{x}}{x} = \frac{\widetilde{y}}{y}$.

Statement 5 follows directly from the definition: $P^U|_{(c=0)} = x$ and $P^U|_{(c>0)} = \widetilde{x}$.

Statement 4 follows directly from the assumption that the time allocated to top-3 non-conflict related stories cannot increase because of an arrival of another story.[38]

□

C. Numerical examples

Suppose, in a given day, there are 3 top stories, each worthy of 8 minutes, and 2 other stories, each of which are 3 minutes long. Without any conflict news, $P = P^U = 24$.

[38] Theoretically, this assumption can be violated if the editors decide to drop some stories completely in order to include the conflict story and these stories were longer than the conflict story; in this case, the editor may increase time allocated to another important non-conflict story. But, in reality, this is very unlikely because the time constraint is binding on all the days, as there are always other stories that the editorial team had initially decided to drop, because they were on the margin before the conflict news arrived.

Suppose now a conflict news arrives, worthy of a 6 minute broadcast. The editor needs to reduce the time allocated to other stories (or drop some of them altogether) to fit this story in the 30-minute newscast. Let us consider the most neutral and the two most extreme examples of the editorial policy.

1) If the editor reduces time allocated to all stories by 20% to fit the conflict story, we get $P = 24$ (i.e., no bias as corrected news pressure did not chance) and $P^U = 19.2$ (a -20% bias). This case illustrates the statement 1 of the Theorem 1.

2) If the editor decides to cut the length of only the top stories to fit the conflict story (such that the length of each of them is reduced from 8 minutes to 6 minutes), then $P = 22.4$ (a -6% bias) and $P^U = 18$ (a -25% bias). This case illustrates the statement 2 of the Theorem 1.

3) If, instead, the editor decides to introduce the conflict story at expense of the non-top-3 stories only, she would need to drop the two non-top-3 stories altogether. In this case, $P = 30$ (a +25% bias) and $P^U = 24$ (no bias). This case illustrates the statement 3 of the Theorem 1.

Note that point 3) is the most extreme example of the upward bias in P. The size of P is *positively* related to the importance of the conflict story: if instead of a 6-minute-worth conflict story, a 3-minute-worth conflict story appeared, P would be $= 26.6$ (compared to 30 with a 6-minute-worth conflict story).

In contrast, in the most extreme example of the downward bias in P, where the conflict story gets into the newscast only at the expense of the top-3 stories, the size of P is *negatively* related to the importance of the conflict story: if instead of a 6-minute-worth story, a 3-minute-worth conflict story appeared, P would be $= 23.3$ (compared to 22.4 with 6-minute-worth conflict story).

D. Quotes from "The IDF and the Press During Hostilities. A Symposium held on 4 June 2002 at The Israel Democracy Institute"

The following quotes are from the publication of the proceedings of a joint symposium between The Israel Defense Forces and The Israel Democracy Institute; see Nevo and Shur, eds (2003); available online at *http://en.idi.org.il/media/1431355/IDFPress.pdf* (accessed on April 19, 2016).

[1] "While mass communication is specifically a civilian tool, it mediates all military action and influences the timing, placement and strategy of rival forces, as well as the concept of victory." (Professor Baruch Nevo and Yael Shur, The Israel Democracy Institute, p.13.)

[2] "Military actions are regularly evaluated in terms of their psychological public relations impact, and the media plays a significant role in creating this impact. [...] timing of entry into Palestinian cities and the duration of the army's stay in these cities take into account various media-related issues such as time differentials, times of major news broadcasts, etc. [...] IDF must consider the media as a factor of strategic significance on the modern battlefield, just as it considers political, military and economic factors. The media is a strategic

consideration in gearing up for battle, in the midst of battle and in the aftermath of battle." (Professor Baruch Nevo and Yael Shur, The Israel Democracy Institute, p.14-15.)

[3] "Prior to embarking on a military operation, media experts should be consulted (similar to consultations with logistics or medical experts) in order to evaluate the likely media repercussions and consequences of the action. Ongoing updates as to the media situation throughout the course of the operation would lead to a more coordinated and appropriate real-time reaction by military and political figures." (Professor Baruch Nevo and Yael Shur, The Israel Democracy Institute, p.17.)

[4] "The IDF operates in two different realms. The first realm is that of physical reality in which it must achieve concrete results (victory, decision, prevention, achievement). The second is the virtual realm where the IDF has a chance to shape the perception of its actions and achievements." (Professor Baruch Nevo and Yael Shur, The Israel Democracy Institute, p.22.)

[5] "One method of dealing with the clash between military needs and media demands is to impose censorship and close certain areas to the media; another is to initiate a series of clandestine actions. In both cases, the price must be taken into account – a price which may be heavy at times, the desire to succeed on the international front at the expense of credible communication with the Israeli public and the families of the soldiers." (Yaron Ezrahi, the civilian media perspective; p.56.)

[6] "A legitimate goal is to maintain a positive image in the Western media, and with the battle being waged in populated areas, it is inevitable that our military decisions are affected by media considerations." (Professor Arnon Zuckerman, Film Department, Tel Aviv University; p.61.)

[7] "Today's media has the most impact on IDF fighting in Nablus, Bethlehem and similar areas. It influences our designation of targets; we delayed entering Bethlehem several times because of the connections associated with Bethlehem and Jenin. It influences the manner of fighting – our decision whether to go in with tanks or to endanger our soldiers by leaving it to the infantry. Our insistence on our not wishing to conquer Bethlehem lacks credibility when anyone who turns on their TV sees a tank flattening everything in its path. Furthermore, the time difference between Israel and the United States has influenced on more than one occasion the timing of an operation, duration of stay in a particular place, etc." (Major General Dan Harel, Head of Operations Directorate, IDF; p.62-63.)

[8] "I was happy to hear that the media is included in IDF's operational orders, but this is not enough. We must make media considerations part of every evaluation preceding an operation, and they must be recognized at every level of command. Moreover, the decision to give a green light on an operation must include the media factor. Throughout the duration of every battle and/or operation we must constantly reassess media impact. In this context we must consider the possibility of enlisting the media as our secret partner before the operation, even if the media's involvement in the details of the operation must be limited." (Major General Rafael Vardi, Retired; p.64.)

[9] “On the assumption that we are viewed as the occupiers in this conflict, that there is natural sympathy for the underdog, that we do not control air time and that what seems right to us does not speak to the other side, we must focus on the significance of the media as a tool and even as part of our arsenal. [...] Our overriding goal in this context is to be capable of influencing, both as the IDF and as the State of Israel, what is broadcast on CNN and other networks. One example would be to arrange a battlefield tour for reporters, making sure that two-thirds of them are objective. This would provide a broader perspective than briefings by the IDF spokesman.” (Brigadier General Eyal Shlein, Division Commander; p.68.)

[10] “There must be a conceptual reevaluation such that our approach to the media in wartime is similar to our approach at the peak of the peace process. We must decide when it is essential to close areas to the press and when a policy of openness is more appropriate; when to flood the arena with information; what approach to take; when we can engineer a leak or direct media presentation.” (Ehud Ya’ari, Political Commentator, Channel Two News; p.72.)

[11] “About thirty years ago I attended a course while serving as a reservist – the highest command course I have taken in the IDF. We were told that the goal of fighting is to achieve the maximum objective at minimum cost. I don’t think this definition has changed fundamentally; what has changed is the scope of objectives and costs. Then the target was a hill, a fortification, an enemy military base, and the cost was measured in terms of casualties, loss of weapons, etc. Today the definition of objective has been expanded to include such intangibles as image and public opinion. [...] The IDF does not ignore the media. The very fact that the IDF announced publicly that is used light weaponry in Jenin rather than arms such as cannons and planes attests to this fact. While the decision not to use heavier arms was based on ethical considerations, the expected presence of the media and its impact on public opinion was certainly relevant.” (Professor Baruch Nevo, Dept. of Psychology, University of Heifa – Project Director of the Army and Society Forum, the Israel Democracy Institute; p.74-75.)

[12] “Part of planning a military operation includes deciding whether to delay the military response in order to retain control of the media. When a terrorist attack has taken place the pictures on the screen are of that attack. The story changes completely the moment the F-16 is in the air; at that moment our window of opportunity slams shut. The reason for our action is no longer of the slightest interest. We must decide to concentrate our efforts and to extend this window of opportunity, thus ensuring that our target audiences we be receptive to our side of the story.” (Brigadier General Ruth Yaron, IDF Spokesperson designate; p.79.)

[13] “This is first and foremost a war of ideology, and as such the media factor, the psychological impact of our actions, is critical. If we understand that a photograph of a tank speaks against us on CNN, we can take this into account in our decision as to whether or not to send in the tank. We schedule helicopter operations for after dark so they cannot be photographed easily and make sure the operation is over within fifteen minutes so the photographers do not have a chance to begin filming. Such considerations are already second nature to us. Officers, certainly on the level of platoon commander, must understand that there are strategic media considerations. The tension between the need to destroy a particular building or to use a tank or helicopter,

and the manner in which the world perceives these actions, can affect the ultimate success or failure of the campaign. Even if we triumph in battle, we can lose in the media and consequently on the ideological plane." (Moshe Ya'alon, Chief of Staff designate; p.84-85.)

[14] "I think that it is important to understand that both the United States and Israel operate in the same media environment that now exists on a twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, never-ending international news cycle." (P. J. Crowley, United States Defense Dept.; p.141.)